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6Calling for progressive  
water policies
By Emanuele Lobina
Cities, regions and countries worldwide are increasingly choosing to close 
the book on water privatisation and to remunicipalise services by taking back 
public control over water and sanitation management. In many cases, this is a 
response to the false promises of private operators and their failure to put the 
needs of communities before profit. This book looks at the growing remunici-
palisation of water supply and sanitation services as an emerging global trend, 
and presents the most complete overview of remunicipalisation cases so far. 
The remunicipalisation trend is a striking fact that could not be predicted as 
recently as 15 years ago, and that is redesigning the landscape of the global 
water sector. This trend contradicts neoliberal theorists, international financial 
institutions, and their expectations of superior private sector performance. 
Also, evidence increasingly points to remunicipalisation as a credible promise 
of a better future for public water services and their beneficiary communities. 
In brief, water remunicipalisation is a story crying out to be told. 
This book aims to draw lessons and stimulate debates on water remunici-
palisation as an under-researched topic of high relevance for citizens, policy-
makers and scholars alike. Based on empirical data, the book documents 
the rise of water remunicipalisation across developed, transition, and 
developing countries in the last 15 years. Drawing on contributions by 
activists, practitioners, and academics with direct experience and knowledge 
of remunicipalisation, the book argues that remunicipalisation is a socially 
and economically viable policy option for local authorities and the com-
munities they represent. As such, the book is intended to serve as a resource 
for building alliances among diverse social actors – including public water 
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managers and decision-makers, workers and their trade unions, civic organ-
isations and social movements, experts and academics – to encourage social 
learning and promote this new form of public service provision.   
Defining remunicipalisation 
Remunicipalisation refers to the return of previously privatised water sup-
ply and sanitation services to public service delivery. More precisely, remu-
nicipalisation is the passage of water services from privatisation in any of 
its various forms – including private ownership of assets, outsourcing of 
services, and public-private partnerships (PPPs)1 – to full public ownership, 
management and democratic control. Indeed, concessions, lease contracts, 
other PPPs, and water privatisation are one and the same thing: all these terms 
refer to the transfer of management control to the private sector, at various 
degrees.2 Water privatisation and PPPs are equally problematic, and their 
problems are deep-seated.3 This explains why remunicipalisation typically 
occurs after local governments terminate unsatisfactory private contracts or 
do not renew them after expiry. However, the remunicipalisation process is 
not necessarily confined to the municipal scale. In some cases regional and 
national authorities act directly as water operators, so the process unfolds 
within this broader context as well. 
Water remunicipalisation is more than a mere change in ownership of service 
provision; it also represents a new possibility for the realisation of collec-
tive ideas of development, such as the human right to water and sustainable 
water development. In other words, remunicipalisation offers opportunities 
for building socially desirable, environmentally sustainable, quality public 
water services benefiting present and future generations. As shown by several 
contributions to this book, the aspirations of local communities for public and 
accountable water services are often part of their struggle to obtain progressive 
social and political change. Without taking into account these aspirations for 
social justice, it is not possible to fully understand water remunicipalisation 
and its global spread. Mere ownership change is not the end goal of water 
remunicipalisation movements.  
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Understanding remunicipalisation 
Remunicipalisation is often a collective reaction against the unsustainability 
of water privatisation and PPPs. Direct experience with common problems 
of private water management – from lack of infrastructure investments, to 
tariff hikes and environmental hazards – has persuaded communities and 
policy-makers that the public sector is better placed to provide quality services 
to citizens and to promote the human right to water and sustainable water 
development. As illustrated by the cases discussed in this book and its compan-
ion briefing Here to stay: Water remunicipalisation as a global trend,4 the factors 
leading to water remunicipalisation are similar worldwide. The false promises 
of water privatisation in developed and developing countries include: poor 
performance, under-investment, disputes over operational costs and price 
increases, soaring water bills, monitoring difficulties, lack of financial trans-
parency, workforce cuts and poor service quality.5 Therefore, another factor 
explaining the emergence of remunicipalisation as a global trend is represented 
by the limitations of the private sector to promote community development. 
These limitations are due to the fact that the private sector is subject to its 
profit maximisation imperative, so that precious resources that could be used 
for collective development are subtracted for private gain.6 
Despite more than three decades of relentless promotion of privatisation and 
PPPs by international financial institutions and like-minded organisations,7 it 
now appears that “water remunicipalisation is a policy option that is here to stay.”8 
Not only have many flagships of water privatisation – from Buenos Aires 
to Jakarta, from La Paz to Dar es Salaam – sunk inexorably. But citizens in 
developed and developing countries have also obtained the replacement of 
profit-oriented private water operations with people-oriented public water 
services, and they are increasingly doing so. While the World Bank and other 
organisations continue to enthusiastically promote PPPs, the emergence of 
remunicipalisation as a global trend is upsetting their plans and undermining 
the neoliberal project of water privatisation. And yet, the remunicipalisa-
tion trend should come as no surprise. Historically, the private sector already 
showed its inadequacy to develop public water services between the end of the 
19th and the beginning of the 20th century.9 
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The private sector limitations that led local governments in the US and across 
Europe to turn to the public sector for an answer to developmental needs 100 
years ago are the same that find a response in the growth of remunicipalisation 
today.10 The first wave of municipalisations resulted in the present dominance 
of public operators in the global water sector.11 This historical surge in public 
ownership, public finance, and collective civil rights allowed for the univer-
salisation of service coverage in North America and Europe. This public pre-
dominance is now being further reinforced by the widespread and increasingly 
rapid diffusion of water remunicipalisation that is documented in this book. 
These precedents point to the developmental potential of water remunici-
palisation in the 21st century. Still, while public ownership can be a powerful 
vehicle for community development, it is not a guarantee of success.12 In 
fact, under the influence of neoliberal forces, many public water operators 
are being commercialised and behave much like private companies.13 This 
suggests that progressive collective action cannot be satisfied with water 
remunicipalisation as mere ownership change but should aim at promoting 
practices that, through public ownership, enhance community development 
and social justice.     
Charting the emergence of the  
remunicipalisation trend: An overview
This introduction is followed by empirical data on the identified cases of 
water remunicipalisation that have occurred in the 15 years between March 
2000 and March 2015. This data has been obtained through the refinement 
and extension of data published in the companion to this book,14 and rep-
resents the most comprehensive catalogue of water remunicipalisation cases 
produced so far. Data collection has been a joint effort in which a number of 
contributors to this book have participated, together with many other water 
activists, practitioners and academics who have generously offered their time, 
dedication and knowledge. 
The water remunicipalisation cases are listed in two tables, one for high-
income countries and the other for middle- and low-income countries.15 
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Each case indicates the population affected by remunicipalisation so as to 
give a measure of the magnitude of this trend and to enable distinguishing 
between urban centres of varying dimensions. In that sense, the listed cases 
range from megacities to small villages. This varied picture suggests that re-
municipalisation is not only happening in urban areas. Indeed, despite their 
limited size and resources, and faced with the unsustainability of privatisation, 
many small towns and villages have challenged powerful private interests and 
remunicipalised their water services. 
The data show that the global remunicipalisation trend is strong, particularly in 
developed countries. Globally, the cases of remunicipalisation have increased 
from two cases in two countries in 2000, when less than one million people 
in total were affected by remunicipalisation, to 235 cases in 37 countries by 
March 2015. By then, the total number of people served by remunicipalised 
water services had grown to exceed 100 million. Cases are more concentrated 
in high-income countries, where 184 remunicipalisations took place in the 
last 15 years, compared to 51 cases in middle- and low-income countries. 
Two countries, France with 94 cases and the US with 58 cases, account for 
the great majority of cases in high-income countries. Cases in high-income 
countries show a marked acceleration: 104 remunicipalisations took place in 
the five years between 2010 and early 2015, while 55 occurred between 2005 
and 2009. The number of remunicipalisation cases has nearly doubled after 
2009. This is due to the example of Paris which signalled an even stronger 
acceleration in France, where the number of remunicipalisation cases trebled 
in the same period: 63 remunicipalisations have been completed in the five 
years between 2010 (when Paris remunicipalised) and early 2015, whereas 
19 remunicipalisations occurred in the 10 years between 2000 and 2009. In 
middle- and low-income countries, the extent and acceleration of remunici-
palisation are less pronounced. However, the list of high profile cases in upper-
middle, lower-middle and low-income countries is impressive and includes: 
Accra (Ghana); Almaty (Kazakhstan); Antalya (Turkey); Bamako (Mali); 
Bogota (Colombia); Budapest (Hungary); Buenos Aires (Argentina); Conakry 
(Guinea); Dar es Salaam (Tanzania); Jakarta (Indonesia); Johannesburg (South 
Africa); Kampala (Uganda); Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia); La Paz (Bolivia); 
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Maputo (Mozambique); and Rabat (Morocco). Also, the population affected 
by remunicipalisation in middle- and low-income countries is far greater than 
in high-income countries: over 81 million people, compared to nearly 25 
million people. The surge in water remunicipalisation is global.
The main lesson that can be drawn from this analysis is that in the last 15 years 
water remunicipalisation has emerged as a global trend that is here to stay. 
Despite the lack of encouragement from international financial institutions, 
national governments and other powerful players,16 remunicipalisation has 
spread across developed, transition and developing countries, primarily as a 
result of the demands of local communities and the responsiveness of local 
governments. The water remunicipalisation trend that only 15 years ago was 
inexistent has since accelerated dramatically and keeps gaining strength. It is 
now impossible for observers to ignore this new form of water service delivery, 
while stakeholders and activists have the opportunity to take inspiration from 
so many remunicipalisation cases for their practice and advocacy. Finally, it 
would be unwise for the World Bank and other promoters of water privatisa-
tion to continue neglecting the calls for water as a common good that fuel social 
resistance against privatisation and drive the global remunicipalisation trend.
A glance at this book 
The global list of remunicipalisation cases and this introduction serve as 
background to the book contributions. The following chapters focus on: the 
experiences with water remunicipalisation in key countries, such as France, 
the US, and Germany; in major cities such as Paris and Jakarta; and on cross-
cutting themes such as the challenge posed to public water services by inves-
tor protection clauses, the position of the trade union movement vis-à-vis 
remunicipalisation as a social project, and performance evaluation as a way 
of measuring the success of remunicipalisation. These chapters aim to draw 
important lessons on the nature, process and outcomes of water remunici-
palisation by combining in-depth analysis of developments at country and 
thematic levels, and the unique insights of privileged observers. These lessons 
are brought together in the concluding chapter.
Introduction
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In Chapter 1 Mary Grant of Food & Water Watch discusses the extent of 
water remunicipalisation in the US, its relative significance compared to pri-
vatisation, and identifies the main determinants of local government decisions 
to remunicipalise. The importance of this contribution is partly due to the 
fact that the US are often regarded as a reference point in relation to public 
policy, and partly due to the contrast between the progressive policies of local 
governments that have decided to remunicipalise their water services and 
the neoliberal policies promoted and often imposed by Washington-based 
multilateral agencies. 
In Chapter 2 Irfan Zamzami and Nila Ardhianie of Amrta Institute for Water 
Literacy write about the failure of the flagship water privatisation in Jakarta 
that led to its recent termination before expiry. They explain the role played in 
the local campaign against water privatisation by a civil lawsuit based on the 
human right to water, and consider the urgency of activating a solidarity-based 
public-public partnership to develop the capacity of the new public water 
operator to guide remunicipalisation in Jakarta. This contribution is a helpful 
reminder of the inability of the private sector to deliver on its own promises 
of efficiency, and points to the potential of collective civil rights as a tool for 
progressive change. 
In Chapter 3 Christa Hecht, General Manager of the Alliance of Public Water 
Associations (AöW), sketches the institutional framework of the German 
water sector, provides an overview of noteworthy cases of remunicipalisation 
in the country, and identifies the key lessons from this national experience. 
These lessons are important as German public water services are considered a 
model of efficiency and effectiveness, and German citizens and local govern-
ments are rediscovering these virtues in light of the failed experiments with 
water privatisation. 
In Chapter 4 Christophe Lime, President of the association of public water 
operators France Eau Publique, describes the institutional framework of the 
French water sector, identifies the determinants of and challenges to water 
remunicipalisation, and considers the opportunities for the development of 
quality public water services in France. This country is highly emblematic 
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given that it is now witnessing the surge of remunicipalisation after having 
privatised water services more than most countries; therefore it has precious 
lessons to offer, both positive and negative. 
In Chapter 5 Anne Le Strat, former President of public water operator Eau de 
Paris and architect of water remunicipalisation in the French capital, engages 
in conversation on the outcomes of water remunicipalisation after five years 
of public water operations. She then turns to reflect on the difficulties of the 
Parisian transition from private to public ownership. This is followed by her 
insights on citizen participation and the greater level of transparency and 
democratic accountability that remunicipalisation has made possible, and the 
role played by Eau de Paris as a source of inspiration for remunicipalisation 
and public service strengthening outside Paris. This chapter complements 
both the French and global pictures of water remunicipalisation. In fact, the 
Paris remunicipalisation is symbolically powerful and many cities in France 
and elsewhere have regarded and still regard Paris as an example to follow. In 
addition, Eau de Paris has been proactive in establishing French and European 
associations of public water operators to promote progressive ideas of public 
water services. 
In Chapter 6 Christine Jakob and Pablo Sanchez of the European Federation 
of Public Service Unions (EPSU) discuss remunicipalisation as an opportunity 
to rethink the way in which water and other public services are provided, 
improving working conditions and strengthening quality public services. 
This chapter is an invaluable reference for workers and social movements to 
understand their respective agendas and build alliances for progressive change. 
In Chapter 7 David McDonald, co-director of the Municipal Services Project, 
takes a critical look at current benchmarking systems as pressurising public 
utilities to behave commercially, and proposes alternative methods for per-
formance evaluation that are more respectful of the needs of community de-
velopment. These reflections are essential to help the public sector rediscover 
its true public ethos. 
In Chapter 8 Satoko Kishimoto of the Transnational Institute (TNI) explains 
how investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms protect private sector 
Introduction
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interests to the detriment of public authorities, threatening the viability of re-
municipalisation. She therefore calls for remunicipalisation to be safeguarded 
as a window of opportunity for the exercise of local democracy and local 
communities’ decisions on their future. 
With Satoko Kishimoto and Olivier Petitjean of the Multinationals 
Observatory, we offer concluding remarks in Chapter 9. Here, in addition 
to a check-list for citizens and policy-makers, we offer a summary of all the 
contributions to this book. This allows us to identify the outcomes of many 
remunicipalisation experiences as: cost savings, increased investment, in-
novative social and environmental policies, and democratic accountability. 
We also consider how public-public partnerships, workers’ involvement, 
and social mobilisation offer opportunities for promoting remunicipalisa-
tion and quality public water services. This contrasts with the imposition 
of policies that prioritise commercial interests over those of communities. 
Remunicipalisation is here to stay and promises a public water future in which 
community development comes first. We need progressive policies to help 
remunicipalisation deliver progressive change.      
Emanuele Lobina is Principal Lecturer, Public Services 
International Research Unit (PSIRU), University of 
Greenwich, UK. He joined PSIRU in 1998 and has written 
extensively on the international experience with water service 
reform. He regularly provides policy advice to international 
organisations, central and local governments, professional 
associations, trade unions and civic organisations.
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
USA 
58
Canada
Russia
Spain    14
14
9
Hungary
Kazakhstan
Uzbekistan
Uruguay
Ecuador
Ukraine
Belgium
Sweden
Albania
Cape Verde
Mexico
Ghana
Guyana
Uganda
Turkey
Mali
Guinea
India
Lebanon
Central African
Republic
Mozambique
Tanzania
Morocco
Malaysia
184
Total cases in  
High-income countries
51
Total cases in  
Low and middle-income  
countries
Indonesia
Colombia
Italy
Bolivia
South Africa
Argentina
Venezuela
France
94
2
2
3
3
2
4
2
2
2
4
1
1
1 2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
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Less than one million people 
in total were affected by 
remunicipalisation in 2000.
The total number of people served  
by remunicipalised water services  
has grown to exceed 100 million.
Sources: PSIRU, France Eau Publique, Food & Water Watch, Corporate Accountability International, Remunicipalisation Tracker
Cases worldwide
Cases by March 2015
Germany
235
2
Cases in 20 1 5Cases in 2000
By year:
By country:
Remunicipalisation 
Global Trend
2000-2015
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Global list of remunicipalisations
March 2015 
The cities that have remunicipalised water and sanitation services between 
March 2000 and March 2015 are listed in the two tables below: one is for 
high-income countries and the other for middle- and low-income countries.1 
The tables do not contain cases of central or local governments that remunici-
palised to subsequently reprivatise water services. 
Where possible, we identified the individual cities that remunicipalised water 
services (as opposed to areas comprising several cities served by the same 
water operator) and indicated the date when the new public operator started 
operating. In a number of cases, information was only available for an area 
comprising several cities served by the same water operator that remunici-
palised at different times, in which specific case we indicated the dates when 
the first and the last city in the area implemented remunicipalisation.  
In other cases we could not identify the exact date of implementation of 
remunicipalisation, for example because ownership transfer was still being 
prepared at the time of writing or because the local government had decided 
that remunicipalisation would take place after March 2015. If ownership 
transfer was still pending at the time of writing, we indicated the date of the 
official decision to remunicipalise and the planned implementation date if 
available. More precisely, status D means that: a) an official decision to remu-
nicipalise was adopted; b) remunicipalisation had not been implemented at 
the time of writing; and, c) no official decision to reprivatise had been taken 
at the time of writing. 
The acceleration of remunicipalisation can be concluded from comparing 
the number of cases of remunicipalisation that took place in different five-
year periods: 2000-2004, 2005-2009, and 2010 to early 2015. The period 
2010 to early 2015 is 63 months, while the period 2005-2009 is 60 months. 
We do not expect this 5 per cent difference between the lengths of the two 
periods to significantly affect our findings on the pace of remunicipalisation. 
To ensure consistency when estimating the acceleration of the trend, we did 
not consider unimplemented decisions to remunicipalise, only those effective 
19
cases for which the new public operator had started operating, whether remu-
nicipalisation had followed contractual termination, expiry of contract and 
non-renewal, sale of shares, or withdrawal of the private operator (statuses T, 
E, S and W, respectively).
Finally, where possible, we indicated the population affected by the remunici-
palisation. This figure does not necessarily coincide with the population of 
the city or cities concerned because the number of residents served by private 
water contracts is often inferior to the overall population. Where we were 
unable to identify the population served by a private contract, we indicated 
the entire population of the city or cities that entered a contract with a private 
operator to subsequently remunicipalise water services.
Country City
Served 
population Date Company Status
1 Belgium Regional (Aquafin) 3,800,000 2006 Severn Trent TS
2 Canada Hamilton 490,000 2005 American Water E
3 France SYDEC Landes 87,000 2000 - 
2014
Veolia, Suez, SAUR E
Extension of the régies to new cities for water (+87000) and sanitation (+50000)
4 France Briançon 12,000 2000 SAUR E
5 France Grenoble (city) 160,000 2001 Suez T
6 France Grenoble Alpes Métropole 320,000 2001 Suez T
48 cities excluding Grenoble
7 France Neufchâteau 7,000 2001 Veolia T
8 France Pays Châtelleraudais  
(communauté d’agglomération)
55,000 2001 Veolia E
13 cities including Châtellerault and Naintré for sanitation
9 France Venelles 8,500 2002 SAUR E
Table 1 High-income countries
Legend
D: Decision to 
remunicipalise,  
not implemented
E: Contract 
expired, and 
remunicipalised
S: Sold by private 
operator, contract 
remunicipalised
T: Contract 
terminated, and 
remunicipalised
W: Private operator 
withdrew, contract 
remunicipalised
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Country City
Served 
population Date Company Status
10 France Communauté de communes 
des Albères et de la Côte 
Vermeille
24,000 2002 - 
2010
  E
12 cities which remunicipalised at expiry
11 France Castres 43,000 2003 Suez T
12 France Fraisses 4,000 2003 Veolia  
13 France Varages 1,100 2004 Suez E
14 France Cherbourg  
(communauté urbaine)
46,000 2005 Veolia E
5 cities
15 France Lanvollon-Plouha 16,500 2005 Veolia/Suez E
16 France Embrun 6,500 2006 Veolia E
17 France Corte 7,000 2007 OEHC E
18 France Cournon d’Auvergne 19,000 2007    
19 France Le Minervois  
(communauté de communes)
6,300 2007   E
15 cities
20 France Saint-Paul (La Réunion) 100,000 2007 Veolia T
Sanitation remunicipalised in 2007, water remunicipalised in 2010
21 France Châtellerault/ Naintré 38,000 2007 Veolia E
22 France Tournon-sur-Rhône 11,000 2007 SAUR E
23 France Angers Loire Métropole 7,000 2008 SAUR E
Extension of the régie to new cities for water and sanitation
24 France Hauteville-Lompnes 4,000 2008    
25 France La Fillière (SIE de La Fillière) 14,000 2008 Suez E
26 France Belley 9,000 2009 Alteau E
27 France Benfeld et environs 17,500 2009 Suez E
Sanitation, joined regional water syndicate SDEA Alsace-Moselle
28 France Digne-les-Bains 18,500 2009 Suez E
29 France La Grand’Combe (S.I.D.E 
de l’Agglomération 
Grand’Combienne )
12,000 2009 Ruas E
5 cities
30 France Mouthe 1,000 2009 Suez E
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31 France Greater Rouen  
(Métropole Rouen Normandie)
145,000 2009 - 
2014
Veolia, Suez E
Progressive extension of the régie to new cities.
32 France Syndicat d’Eau du  Roumois 
et du Plateau du Neubourg 
(SERPN)
65,000 2009 Veolia E
108 cities
33 France Saint-André,  
Falicon et la Trinité
17,000 2009 Veolia/Ruas E
Now part of Métropole Nice Cote d’Azur
34 France Greater Albi (communauté 
d’agglomération de 
l’Albigeois)
84,000 2010 Suez E
Sanitation only remunicipalised (water always remained public)
35 France Annonay 17,000 2010 SAUR E
36 France Bonneville 12,000 2010 Veolia E
37 France Lucé (communauté de 
communes de Lucé)
15,000 2010 Veolia E
14 cities
38 France Paris 2,200,000 2010 Veolia/Suez E
39 France Saint-Jean-de-Braye 19,000 2010 SAUR E
40 France Bordeaux 740,000 2011 
(2018)
Suez D
This remunicipalisation is still debated and there are signs that the newly elected local authorities might 
reconsider their decision.
41 France Brignole 18,000 2011 Veolia E
42 France Causse Noir (SIAEP) 25,000 2011 Veolia E
10 cities
43 France Gueugnon 9,000 2011 Suez E
Sanitation was also remunicipalised in 2015
44 France Lacs de l’Essonne 32,000 2011 Veolia/Suez E
45 France Le Gouray 1,100 2011 Veolia E
46 France Greater Nantes NA 2011 Veolia/Suez E
47 France Ploubezre 3,000 2011 Veolia E
48 France Saint Brieuc Agglomération 52,000 2011 - 
2018
Veolia D
49 France Syndicat de la Baie 5,000 2011 Veolia E
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50 France Tarnos, Ondres, Boucau  
and St-Martin-de-Seignaux
29,000 2011 Suez E
51 France Vierzon 28,000 2011 Veolia E
52 France Brest Métropole 213,000 2012 Veolia E
53 France Chenal du Four  
(Syndicat du Chenal du Four)
6,000 2012 Veolia E
54 France Gâtine (Syndicat Mixte  
des Eaux de la Gâtine)
56,000 2012 Suez E
55 France Landerneau  
(SIDEP de Landerneau)
20,000 2012 Veolia E
56 France Muret 24,000 2012 Veolia E
Part of the service is still outsourced
57 France Saint-Malo 48,000 2012 Veolia E
58 France Schweighouse (SIVOM) 12,000 2012 Suez E
Sanitation, joined regional water syndicate SDEA Alsace-Moselle
59 France Sélestat 60,000 2012 Veolia E
Sanitation
60 France Argenton-sur-Creuse 5,000 2013 Veolia E
61 France Basse Vallée de l’Adour 
(syndicat intercommunal)
31,000 2013 Suez E
25 cities
62 France Beaurepaire et 
Saint-Barthélémy
6,000 2013    
63 France Capbreton 8,000 2013 Suez E
64 France Évry Centre Essonne 116,000 2013 Suez E
65 France Gannat 6,000 2013 Veolia E
Joined SIVOM Sioule et Bouble
66 France Kermorvan-Kersauzon  
(syndicat des eaux)
19,000 2013 Veolia  
67 France Lamentin, Saint-Joseph  
and Schoelcher (Martinique)
77,000 2013 Suez/Veolia E
Sanitation, joined the communité d’agglomération CACEM’s régie
68 France Péronne 9,000 2013   E
69 France Saint-Pierre des Corps 15,000 2013 Veolia E
Water service is still partly outsourced to Veolia (installations and meters).  
Sanitation was remunicipalised in 2012.
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70 France Valence-Moissace-Puymirol 
(syndicat des eaux)
5,000 2013 SAUR E
71 France Aubagne 46,000 2014 Veolia E
Joined SPL Eau des Collines for water
72 France Barousse Comminges Save 58,000 2014 SEM Pyrénées T
73 France Beaulieu, Cap d’Ail, Eze  
et Villefranche-sur-Mer 
17,000 2014 Veolia E
Now part of métropole Nice Côte d’Azur
74 France Blois 48,000 2014 
(2016)
Veolia D
75 France Capesterre-Belle-Eau 
(Guadeloupe)
20,000 2014 Veolia E
Taking effect 2016
76 France Castelsarrasin 13,000 2014 SAUR E
77 France Courgent 400 2014 Suez T
78 France Montpellier Méditerranée 
Métropole
350,000 2014 
(2016)
Veolia D
Taking effect 2016
79 France Pays d’Aubagne et de l’Étoile 105,000 2014 Veolia E
12 cities, including Aubagne and La Penne-sur-Huveaune, joined SPL Eau des Collines for sanitation
80 France La Penne-sur-Huveaune 6,000 2014 Veolia E
Joined SPL Eau des Collines for Water
81 France Mommenheim (SICTEU) 6,000 2014 Suez E
Sanitation, joined regional water syndicate SDEA Alsace-Moselle
82 France Portes de l’Eure (communauté 
d’agglomération)
20,000 2014 Veolia, SAUR D
39 cities will be added over time as contracts expire
83 France Terre de Bas  
(îles des Saintes, Guadeloupe)
1,000 2014 Veolia E
Remunicipalised together with Capesterre Belle Eau
84 France Terre de Haut  
(îles des Saintes, Guadeloupe)
2,000 2014 Veolia E
Remunicipalised together with Capesterre Belle Eau
85 France Bastia (communauté 
d’agglomération)
58,000 2015 OEHC E
86 France Brugheas 1,500 2015 Veolia E
Joined SIVOM Sioule et Bouble
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87 France Fleury les Aubrais 21,000 2015 SAUR E
Service is still partly outsourced
88 France Lamentin / Saint-Joseph 
(Martinique)
57,000 2015 Suez/Veolia E
Sanitation was remunicipalised in 2013 - both through joining the CACEM régie
89 France Nice (city) 348,000 2015 Veolia E
Now part of Métropole Nice Côte d’Azur
90 France Pays de Bitche 25,000 2015 Veolia E
Joined SDEA Alsace-Moselle
91 France Pays de Nay  
(SEPA du Pays de Nay)
25,000 2015 SAUR E
92 France Quimperlé 12,000 2015 Veolia E
93 France Rennes  
(Eau du Bassin rennais)
480,000 2015 Veolia E
56 cities. Production was remunicipalised over the whole area (480000),  
distirbution over Rennes city only (230000)
94 France SIAEAG (Guadeloupe) 100,000 2015 Veolia E
95 France Troyes 60,000 2015 Veolia E
96 France Valence 65,000 2015 Veolia E
97 Germany Krefeld 222,058 2005 RWE T
98 Germany Bergkamen 110,000 2008 Gelsenwasser T
99 Germany Stuttgart 613,392 2010- EnBW D
100 Germany Solingen 155,768 2012 MVV Energie AG T
101 Germany Bielefeld 328,864 2012 Stadtwerke Bremen/
Essent
T
102 Germany Oranienburg 42,000 2012 Gelsenwasser T
103 Germany Berlin 3,501,870 2013 Veolia/RWE T
104 Germany Burg (Sachsen-Anhalt) 22,000 2014 Veolia E
105 Germany Rostock 200,000 2014- Remondis D
106 Italy Imperia 200,000 2012- IREN D
107 Italy Reggio Emilia 482,287 2012 IREN D
108 Italy Varese 889,000 2013 A2A D
109 Italy Termoli 33,000 2015 Acea D
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110 Russia Arzamas 120,000 2014 Remondis W
111 Spain Medina Sidonia 11,794 2003 Aqualia T
112 Spain Huesna (Alanís de la Sierra, 
Alcolea del Río, Almadén de 
la Plata, Brenes, Las Cabezas, 
Cantillana, Carmona, Cañada 
Rosal, Constantina, El Coronil, 
El Cuervo, El Madroño, Los 
Molares, Lebrija, Los Palacios 
y Vfca., El Pedroso, El Real de 
la Jara, Tocina, Vva. Del Río y 
Minas, El Viso del Alcor, San 
Nicolás del Puerto, Utrera)
126,845 2007 ACS  Actividades 
de Construcción y 
Servicios
T
113 Spain Figaró Montmany 1,112 2009 CASSA Group T
114 Spain Arenys de Munt 8,588 2011 SOREA (AGBAR) T
115 Spain Arteixo 31,005 2013 Aqualia (FCC) T
116 Spain La Línea de la Concepción  62,697 2013 Aqualia (FCC) T
117 Spain Manacor 41,049 2013 Agua Manacor S.A.  
118 Spain Alfes 315 2014 Aigües de Catalunya W
119 Spain Ermua 10,109 2014 Suez T
120 Spain Estella del Marqués 1,486 2014 Aqualia T
121 Spain Guadalcacín 5,233 2014 Aqualia T
122 Spain Montornés del Vallès 16,217 2014 Familiar privada D
123 Spain Rascafría 2,000 2014 Canal Gestión SA T
124 Spain Torrecera 1,254 2014 Aqualia T
125 Sweden Norrköping 87,247 2005 EON S
126 Uruguay Maldonado Department 96,000 2005 Aguas de Bilbao T
127 USA Atlanta, GA 1,200,000 2003 Suez T
128 USA Angleton, TX 18,862 2004 Veolia T
129 USA Plainfield, IN 27,631 2004 United Water T
130 USA Laredo, TX 236,191 2005 United Water (Suez) T
131 USA Coxsackie, NY 8,918 2005 Veolia T
132 USA Jackson, AL 5,228 2005 Veolia  
133 USA Pekin, IL 34,094 2005 United Water E
134 USA East Aurora, NY 6,236 2005 Veolia E
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135 USA Conroe, TX 61,533 2005 Veolia T
136 USA Demopolis, AL 7,483 2006 Veolia E
137 USA Five Star Water Supply 
District, AL
100 2006 Veolia T
138 USA Southern Water & Sewer 
District, KY
23,524 2006 Veolia T
139 USA North Brunswick, NJ 40,742 2006 United Water T
140 USA Logan, WV 11,000 2006 Veolia E
141 USA Petaluma  
(wastewater treatment), CA
58,142 2007 Veolia E
142 USA Houston (water treatment), TX 2,700,000 2007 United Water (Suez) T
143 USA Karnes City, TX 3,042 2007 Veolia E
144 USA Winchester, NH 4,341 2008 United Water T
145 USA Stockton, CA 300,899 2008 OMI-Thames Water T
146 USA Fairfield-Suisun  
(wastewater treatment), CA
135,296 2008 United Water (Suez) T
147 USA Central Elmore  
Water & Sewer Authority, AL
50,000 2008 Veolia  
148 USA Cave Creek, AZ 9,000 2008 American Water E
149 USA Horn Lake, MS 15,545 2008 Southwest Water T
150 USA Odem, TX 2,499  2008 Veolia T
151 USA Hayden, ID 13,294 2009 Veolia T
152 USA Durham County, NC 8,000 2009 United Water T
153 USA Burley  
(wastewater treatment), ID
9,578 2009 Veolia T
154 USA Surprise, AZ 27,116 2009 American Water E
155 USA Biddeford, ME 21,383 2009 CH2M Hill OMI E
156 USA O’Fallon, MO 25,002 2009 Alliance Water 
Resources
E
157 USA Kline, PA 1,591 2009 United Water W
158 USA North Adams, MA 13,708 2010 United Water T
159 USA Overton, TX 2,554 2010 Veolia T
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160 USA Freeport, IL 25,638 2010 United Water E
161 USA Evansville, IN 117,429 2010 American Water E
162 USA Gary, IN 180,000 2010 United Water T
City voted to terminate but then negotiated a “transition agreement” with the company to avoid paying  
$450,000 in termination fees. So United Water could say the deal was not officially ‘ terminated’.
163 USA Liberty, MO 3,000 2010 CH2M Hill OMI T
164 USA Webb City, MO 10,996 2010 CH2M Hill OMI E
165 USA Skaneateles, NY 5,116 2010 Severn Trent T
166 USA Lampasas, TX 7,868 2010 CH2M Hill OMI T
167 USA Leander, TX 25,740 2010 Southwest Water  
168 USA Whitesburg  
(water and wastewater),KY
2,139 2011 Veolia T
169 USA Brunswick -Glynn County, GA 79,626 2011 United Water T
170 USA Tama, IA 2,877 2011 Veolia T
171 USA Schenectady  
(wastewater treatment), NY
66,135 2011 Veolia T
172 USA Plymouth  
(water and wastewater), NC
3,878 2011 Veolia E
173 USA Manchester Township, NJ 35,976 2011 United Water  
174 USA Summit City, NJ 21,457 2011 United Water T
175 USA New Albany  
(wastewater treatment), IN
36,372 2012 American Water E
176 USA Gladewater, TX 6,275 2012 Veolia T
177 USA Lanett AL 6,468 2012 Veolia  
178 USA Barstow, CA 22,639 2012 United Water E
179 USA Coeburn, VA 2,139 2013 Veolia T
180 USA Weslaco, TX 35,670  2013 CH2M Hill  T
181 USA Cameron, TX 5,770 2013 Severn Trent T
182 USA Storm Lake, IA 10,600 2013 Veolia T
183 USA Reidsville, NC 14,520 2014 United Water T
184 USA Oakland County, MI 59,515 2014 United Water T
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185 Albania Elbasan 100,000 2007 Berlinwasser 
International
T
186 Argentina Buenos Aires Province  
(74 cities)
2,500,000 2002 Enron W
187 Argentina Buenos Aires 9,000,000 2006 Suez T
188 Argentina Buenos Aires Province  
(Gran, 6th subregion)
1,700,000 2006 Impregilo T
189 Argentina Santa Fe and Rosario 2,000,000 2006 Suez T
190 Argentina Catamarca 200,000 2008 Proactiva T
191 Argentina Salta 1,100,000 2009 Latinaguas T
192 Argentina La Rioja 200,000 2010 Latin Aguas T
193 Argentina Mendoza 1,100,000 2010 Saur T
194 Bolivia Cochabamba 900,000 2000 Bechtel T
195 Bolivia La Paz/El Alto 1,600,000 2007 Suez T
196 Cape Verde National 200,000 2005 Aguas de Portugal TS
197 Central 
African 
Republic
Bangui 80,000 2003 SAUR WS
198 Colombia Bogota (treatment plant) 1,500,000 2004 Suez T
203 Guyana National 740,000 2007 Severn Trent T
204 Hungary Kaposvar 64,872 2009 Suez E
205 Hungary Pecs 150,000 2009 Suez T
206 Hungary Borsodviz 190,000 2010 Gelsenwasser T
207 Hungary Budapest 1,740,000 2012 Suez, RWE T
208 India Latur 390,000 2012 SPML (Shubash Projects 
and Marketing Ltd)
T
209 Indonesia Badung Bali 543,332 2013 Mahasara Buana, Intan 
Dyandra Mulya, Dewata 
Artha Kharisma
E
210 Indonesia Jakarta 9,900,000 2015- Suez D
The Central Jakarta District Court on 24 March 2015 annulled the privatised water contracts signed with  
Suez (Palyja) and Aetra and ordered the water services to be brought back to the state-owned water company
211 Kazakhstan Ust-Kamenogorsk 303,720 2007 IR-Group T
Table 2 Low and middle-income countries
199 Colombia Bogota (water supply) 7,000,000 2013 Acea, Proactiva E
200 Ecuador Machala 240,000 2012 Oriolsa T
201 Ghana National 5,100,000 2011 Vitens, Rand Water E
202 Guinea Conakry and 16 other  
smaller urban centres
1,824,000 2003 SAUR and Veolia W
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212 Kazakhstan Almaty 1,600,000 2005 Veolia T
213 Kazakhstan Astana (bulk water supply)  639,311 2003 Veolia W
214 Lebanon Tripoli 400,000 2007 Suez E
215 Malaysia Kuala Lumpur  
(Selangor state)
5,411,324 2014- Syabas, PNSB, 
SPLASH, ABASS
D
216 Malaysia Indah Water Consortium 
(sanitation)
6,100,000 2001 Prime Utilities S
217 Mali Bamako 1,500,000 2005 SAUR T
218 Mexico Ramos Arizpe 48,228 2014 Suez T
219 Morocco Rabat-Salé region 2,200,000 2014 Redal (Veolia) DS
Outcome still pending
220 Morocco Tanger-Tétouan 1,400,000 2014 Amendis (Veolia) DS
Outcome still pending
221 Mozambique Beira, Nampula, Quelimane 
and Pemba (and Chokwé, 
Inhambane, Maxixe and Xai-Xai)
242,143 2008 Aguas de Mozambique 
(SAUR and Aguas de 
Portugal)
E
222 Mozambique Maputo 1,766,184 2010 Aguas de Portugal T
223 South Africa Amahthali (Stutterheim) 200,000 2005 Suez E
224 South Africa Johannesburg 500,000 2006 Suez E
225 South Africa Nkonkobe (Fort Beaufort) 130,000 2002 Suez T
226 Tanzania Dar es Salaam 750,000 2005 Biwater T
227 Turkey Antalya 2,158,000 2002 Suez T
228 Turkey Izmit 1,600,000 2014 Thames Water T
229 Uganda Kampala 1,720,000 2004 ONDEO E
230 Ukraine Lugansk 424,113 2014 Rosvodokoanal T
231 Ukraine Kirovograd 293,444 2008 Water Services, LLC T
232 Uzbekistan Bukhara 247,000 2007 Veolia, then Amiwater T
A second contract with Amiwater was also terminated in 2007
233 Uzbekistan Samarkand 412,000 2007 Veolia, then Amiwater T
A second contract with Amiwater was also terminated in 2007
234 Venezuela Monagas State 552,000 2001 FCC E
235 Venezuela Lara State 1,100,000 2002 Aguas de Valencia T
Total served population                                105,917,656
Endnotes
1  The World Bank’s classification of countries and lending groups is available at: http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/CLASS.XLS (accessed on 14 March 2015).  
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Chapter One
Water in public hands: 
Remunicipalisation in  
the United States
By Mary Grant
Most people in the United States receive their water and sewer services from 
publicly owned and operated utilities, and the movement to retain, secure and 
strengthen public water services is strong and vibrant. 
The United States has about 50,000 community water systems and 20,000 
wastewater collection systems.1 Nearly all wastewater services are publicly 
owned and public provision also dominates drinking water services.2 Local 
governments and other public entities serve 86 per cent of the population 
through community water systems.3 
A long history of municipalisation
Historically, private water companies served many of the nation’s largest cities 
until the turn of the 20th century, when cholera outbreaks and destructive 
fires inspired a surge of municipalisations. From 1880 to 1920, thousands of 
cities – including Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York City, 
Philadelphia and San Francisco – assumed public control of water provision 
to improve water quality and extend service to low-income areas neglected 
by private providers.4 
The movement to public ownership continues today. From 2007 to 2013, the 
population served by privately owned community water systems fell by 7 mil-
lion, while the population served by local governments grew by 17 million.5 
Local governments are indeed expanding services to new areas and buying 
private systems with considerable frequency. This often occurs as cities grow; 
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local governments purchase systems in newly annexed areas and consolidate 
them with existing public infrastructure to improve services, distribute costs 
and better manage water resources.6
Remunicipalisation: A strong force 
Despite aggressive corporate efforts, privatisation of government-owned water 
and sewer systems remains uncommon in the United States. Further, a 2012 
national survey found that only 6 per cent of local governments contract out 
water and sewer services to private, for-profit entities.7 
Although privatisation is relatively rare, every year a handful of local govern-
ments exit such arrangements and return water or sewer systems to public 
operation. Remunicipalisation of water and sewer services is a strong force 
among contracting governments.
Since 2000, major water companies have lost 169 contracts to remunicipalisa-
tion.8 That’s a large number compared to existing private water management 
contracts, considering that four of the largest companies, representing an 
estimated 70 per cent of the US water outsourcing market, had a total of just 
760 government clients in 2013.9 
How communities remunicipalise 
Local governments typically remunicipalise water and sewer services by letting 
contracts expire or terminating contracts for convenience. That is, many deals 
allow municipalities to exit the arrangement early for any reason as long as the 
private operator is given sufficient notice, although governments may have 
to pay termination fees. “Termination for convenience” clauses and short 
contract terms are important checks on privatisation. Without them, it can be 
difficult for local governments to bring services back under public operation.
In some cases, governments have ended contracts because of serious violations 
of contract provisions. This is known as “termination for cause.” It can be 
difficult, however, for a government to prove that the company has materially 
breached a contract, and many deals require arbitration first. Sometimes when 
governments threaten to terminate a contract, companies will try to negotiate 
a no-fault settlement to avoid blame or bad publicity, while waiving a portion 
of the termination fees for the government. 
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Top reasons why local governments seek public control
Local governments remunicipalise their water or sewer services primarily to 
reduce costs and improve service. 
Saving money
Cost savings, in particular, is a driving force of remunicipalisation in the 
United States. A Food & Water Watch survey of 18 communities that re-
municipalised water or sewer services between 2007 and 2010 found that 
public operation cut costs in these communities by an average 21 per cent.10 
Municipalities have realised significant savings by exiting privatisation ar-
rangements and returning systems to public hands. The cases of Coeburn and 
that of Fairfield and Suisun are exemplary in this regard.
Coeburn, Virginia. In 2013 Coeburn, a small town in Virginia, was struggling 
to balance its budget. Its reserve fund had dropped dramatically since the 
Great Recession. Although the town had been able to reduce costs in every 
other department, its public works department was locked into a privatisation 
contract that required a payment increase to the private company.  
Since 2009, Veolia Water North America, a subsidiary of the French multina-
tional, had run Coeburn’s entire public works department, including the water 
and sewer systems. In 2013, the town paid the company $1.41 million – an 
astonishing 96 per cent of total annual budget. The contract was simply too 
expensive, so the town council voted not to renew the deal when it expired. 
In April 2014, the town resumed public operation of the department, cutting 
costs by 28 per cent.11 
Fairfield and Suisun, California. In 2008, after three decades of private opera-
tion of the wastewater treatment plant, the board of directors of the Fairfield-
Suisun Sewer District in California unanimously voted to cancel the contract 
with United Water and use public employees to run the facility. The district 
determined that remunicipalisation would save money and improve service. 
The district had first privatised the operation and maintenance of the treat-
ment plant in 1976. After a series of other contractors, United Water, a 
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subsidiary of French multinational Suez Environnement, took over the plant 
in 2007 when it bought the company that had earlier received a five-year 
deal with the district. By then, the district’s board of directors had come to 
question whether private operation was in the public’s best interest. When 
United Water took control, the district hired independent consultants to 
review options.12
The consultants found that public operation would cut costs in 5 per cent in 
the first year and 10 to 15 per cent in subsequent years.13 The report concluded 
that private contracting costs would otherwise continue to “increase signifi-
cantly” because of market consolidation and the “profitability goals” of the 
companies that would vie for any new deal.14
With public operation, the district could also attract and retain the neces-
sary qualified personnel and improve performance. Under privatisation, the 
district’s contractors had struggled to maintain adequate staffing and stable 
management.15 There were five different plant managers in the previous five 
years, and the maintenance manager position was vacant at the time of the 
consultants’ assessment. Staffing difficulties would have likely only worsened 
over time. The consultant projected that one-fifth of the district’s staff would 
retire in the coming years, and that because private contractors offered worse 
compensation packages than their public counterparts in the area, it would be 
more difficult for a private firm to hire the necessary staff from an increasingly 
limited labour pool.16
Since 2008, public operation has met or exceeded expectations. The district 
has increased and then retained operation and maintenance staff levels.17 In 
the first year of public operation, remunicipalisation cut total operating costs 
by 7 per cent, saving taxpayers $1.3 million.18 In fact, annual operating costs 
were lower by 2014 than in the final year of the privatisation contract.19 
Improving service
Beyond financial reasons, communities remunicipalise water and sewer ser-
vices to improve performance. Unresponsive customer service and inadequate 
maintenance are frequent complaints under privatisation deals. 
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Cameron, Texas. In 2013, the city council of Cameron, Texas, unanimously 
voted to sever its contract with Severn Trent. Four years earlier, in 2009, the 
company had received a five-year deal to operate and manage the city’s water 
and wastewater systems, promising to cut costs and improve service through 
better staff training and system upkeep.20 
Within a few years, the city was deeply dissatisfied with the company’s per-
formance – from brown, foul-smelling water to inadequate treatment that 
prompted requirements to boil water before consumption to other violations.21 
“We hired you to take care of the water,” city council member Bill Harris told 
two senior Severn Trent representatives at a 2012 meeting. “I feel you’ve fallen 
down on the job.”22
In March 2013, the city took over the water and wastewater departments and 
began “working through challenges that Severn Trent left us with.”23 Despite 
the problems with and frustration over the company’s performance, Cameron 
had to pay $64,000 to terminate the deal early.24
The city then began to address the problems left from the privatisation fail-
ure,25 assisted in part by a $250,000 Community Development Block Grant 
for water meter upgrades to reduce unaccounted-for water.26 As part of its 
water conservation and drought contingency plan, the city also prioritised 
repairing water leaks. By July 2014, the utilities director Curtis Donovan 
reported that the water department met all permit requirements and had a 
satisfactory state review on quality levels.27 
Gain local control to better manage water resources
Public control makes coordination across municipal departments and 
government jurisdictions possible, allowing for better resource manage-
ment. For example, many cities’ water and transportation departments work 
together to time water pipeline replacements with street repairs to avoid 
redundant repaving work. Cities also use wastewater department trucks for 
other government tasks, including snow removal, and water department 
employees can help prepare for emergencies and natural disasters such as 
hurricanes.28
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Private contractors and utilities, in comparison, have no incentive to share 
equipment and staffing with city departments, and they are not required to 
cooperate with government agencies to protect water resources, manage wa-
tersheds and work for long-term sustainability. 
Cave Creek, Arizona. In 2008, Cave Creek, Arizona, assumed full public con-
trol of its water and sewer services after buying two private water systems and 
deciding against renewing contracts with American Water.
Cave Creek’s water systems had been privately owned since their inception. 
Worried about insufficient water supplies and system upkeep, and facing 
water shortages that left county residents with intermittent outages and low 
pressure, the town decided to pursue public ownership and management to 
secure its water future.29
“We need to have control of the water utility so we can plan five, 10 and 20 
years down the road,” explained Cave Creek Mayor Vincent Francia in 2005.30
The town purchased two private water systems: the Desert Hills Water 
Company for $2.5 million in 2006 and the Cave Creek Water Company 
for $19.5 million in 2007. Cave Creek received low-interest loans from the 
Water Infrastructure Financing Authority, the state agency responsible for 
distributing federally subsidised State Revolving Fund assistance, to purchase 
the systems and make necessary improvements.31
At the time, the town hired American Water, which already operated the town’s 
wastewater treatment plant, to run the water systems for one year. When the 
contracts expired, the town opted for full public control. During 2008, the town 
began publicly operating the water systems and wastewater treatment plant. 
At a November 2007 meeting, Jessica Marlow, the town’s utilities manager, 
said that there were three reasons why the town was taking over the operation 
of the water systems: “to improve customer service,” “bring management and 
services locally” and “improve financial sustainability.”32
Later during the same meeting, town clerk Carrie Dyrek outlined the “advan-
tages of local control,” including that local staff will provide all services. “Who 
[would be] better to assess the needs of our community?” she asked, answering: 
“The local employees who live and work in this community.”33
Chapter One
36
In just the first two years of public control, Cave Creek invested $16.2 million 
in upgrading its water systems and storage tanks to improve the reliability and 
sustainability of its water supply.34 
Onward
Public operation of drinking water and wastewater services prevails in the 
United States. Privatisation remains relatively uncommon, but each year 
several communities across the country remunicipalise their water and sewer 
services. The decisions to remunicipalise are pragmatic. Municipalities evalu-
ate privatisation contracts on costs and performance criteria and determine 
that public operation is the best option. Local governments have saved mil-
lions of dollars and improved the quality of their water services through locally 
accountable public management. For communities across the United States, 
remunicipalisation has been a resounding success.
Mary Grant is a researcher for Food & Water Watch, a US non-profit consumer 
advocacy organisation that works to ensure that food, water and fish people consume 
is safe, accessible and sustainably produced. Her work focuses on water privatisation 
and infrastructure financing in the United States.
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Chapter Two
An end to the struggle?  
Jakarta residents reclaim  
their water system
by Irfan Zamzami and Nila Ardhianie
Privatisation of water services in Jakarta has failed. The evidence speaks for 
itself. Water services coverage in the Indonesian capital remains low at only 
59 per cent.1 The infrastructure is in bad shape with the leakage level as high 
as 44 per cent, a situation repeatedly denounced by the Governor.2 As a result, 
among the lucky half of the population that does get access to piped water, 
water quality is poor.
Consequently, on 24 March 2015 the Central Jakarta District Court annulled 
the privatised water contracts following a citizen lawsuit. Water privatisa-
tion was deemed negligent in fulfilling the human right to water for Jakarta’s 
residents. The court also ordered the water services to be brought back to the 
state-owned water company.3
The private sector got officially involved in Jakarta’s water services in 1997, 
when Suharto’s dictatorial power was still solid in Indonesia. At the time, 
foreign water companies Thames (UK) and Suez (France) obtained a 25-
year concession over water management, granting them the exclusive right 
to deliver water services in the capital city. Each operator was given control 
over half of the metropolitan area: the western part is serviced by PT PAM 
Lyonnaise Jaya (Palyja, owned at 51 per cent by Suez and at 49 per cent by 
Indonesian infrastructure company Astratel Nusantara) and the eastern part 
by PT Aetra Air Jakarta (Aetra, owned by Singapore-based Acuatico since 2007 
with Indonesian company PT Alberta Utilities holding 5 per cent of shares). 
Since then, the private operators have been earning high profits in a low-risk 
business while causing huge financial losses for the public Jakarta Drinking 
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Water Utility (PAM Jaya), which oversees the contracts with the private con-
cessionaires. These public losses added up to as much as IDR 510 billion in 
2010 (approximately US$54 million) and could reach IDR 18.2 trillion if the 
cooperation agreement were to continue until its expiry date in 2022. 
The government is discontented because the capital city’s water services are poor 
and public money is being spent to cover losses caused by privatisation.4 Water 
tariffs increased on 10 occasions since, making it much higher than in other cit-
ies while service quality remains poor. Outages are frequent and in 2013 alone 
nearly 40,000 complaints were filed by users regarding tap water deficiency.5
Not only are residents and public managers discontented with privatisation, 
water workers too have been negatively affected.6 Some 2,800 of the 3,000 
utility workers were transferred to the private companies after the concession 
was signed, but their contractual situation remained unclear. Afterwards, the 
new workers recruited directly by the private companies obtained better con-
ditions, for example on skills training, health insurance, salary and allowance, 
as well as safety. This has created a double standard within the workforce. One 
worker who had been working for nine years with the water utility declares 
never having received a basic salary raise since privatisation. 
Citizens unite to remunicipalise
Even though the resistance against water privatisation is as old as the privatisa-
tion itself, it gained momentum in 2011 when residents, water workers and 
civil society organisations formed the Coalition of Jakarta Residents Opposing 
Water Privatization (KMMSAJ). The coalition has organised through various 
strategies, from rallies, public discussions and policy dialogues, to requesting 
information disclosure, circulating petitions and filing a citizen lawsuit. 
In January 2012 KMMSAJ also brought to light an alleged corruption case 
that involves PAM Jaya and the two private operators by petitioning the 
Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). This corruption case, currently 
being investigated by KPK, would involves IDR 561 billion (US$43.2 mil-
lion).7 Tempo Magazine, which investigated the case, found a link between this 
corruption case and the Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2012.8 
Chapter Two
42
The most important step was taken in November 2012 when KMMSAJ initi-
ated a Citizen Lawsuit against water privatisation. The defendants in the law-
suit were the President, the Vice-President, Finance Minister, Public Works 
Minister, and the Governor of Jakarta. Other defendants include the Jakarta 
House of Representatives, Jakarta water company PAM Jaya’s president direc-
tor, and the two private operators Palyja and Aetra.9
In this lawsuit, the plaintiff accuses the defendants of negligence by unlawfully 
arranging the water privatisation contract agreement. Indeed, the contract 
itself is considered as violating the Constitution and other regulations related 
with water resources and clean water provision, which require delivery by the 
state through a public water company. 
This lawsuit played an important role for its influence on policy-makers. After 
the Citizen Lawsuit was launched, the Governor of Jakarta Joko Widodo de-
clared in March 2013 that water privatisation would be ended. In October 2014 
then-deputy governor of Jakarta Basuki Tjahaja Purnama confirmed that the 
government was considering the acquisition of the private firms’ shares through 
Jakarta’s public water utility PAM Jaya considering the class-action lawsuit.10
The Governor’s plan to acquire the private operators’ shares through PAM Jaya 
was taken seriously by the court, and the verdict was postponed twice to create 
space for an out-of-court settlement. The governor of Jakarta issued a letter in 
February 2015 instructing the public water company PAM Jaya to take over 
water services from the private operators. The Central Jakarta District Court’s 
24 March decision to annul the privatised water contracts on the grounds that 
the water privatisation was negligent in fulfilling residents’ human right to water 
confirms that this is the road taken. Remunicipalisation is just one step away!
The privatisation context in Jakarta 
The cooperation agreement with Aetra and Palyja was restated in 2001 to 
adjust with the political and economic situation post-1998 financial crisis. It 
was followed by a five-year target adjustment.
It was not until 2011 that PAM Jaya openly expressed disappointment with 
the contract agreement and proposed renegotiation. The director of PAM Jaya 
stated that privatisation would sink the public water utility into huge financial 
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losses (up to IDR 18.2 trillion) if the cooperation agreement continued as 
planned until its expiry date in 2022.
The renegotiation process did not run smoothly. Aetra was the first to agree to 
compromise with some renegotiated items, which were included as addendum 
to the cooperation agreement in December 2012. The approved items were: 
to lower the Internal Rate of Return, which was considered too high, from 22 
to 15.8 per cent (the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency, BPKP, 
evaluated the reasonable rate for water services in Jakarta at 14.68 per cent); 
to eliminate current shortfall debt; and to decrease the leakage level from 29 
to 25 per cent. Palyja, on the other hand, refused to make any changes.
The cooperation agreement has been problematic because of its emphasis on 
the private operators’ business profit. The payment mechanism adopted in the 
contract agreement differentiates between “water charge” and “water tariff”. 
The former is the rate paid by PAM Jaya to the private operators, while the 
latter is the rate paid by customers to PAM Jaya. The water charge is subject to 
adjustments regardless of policy decisions related to the water tariff. 
The initial water charge as of 1 April 2001 was IDR 2,400, and was to be 
adjusted every six months. This soon created a structural problem because 
PAM Jaya did not have similar flexibility in increasing tariffs because most 
residents could not afford it.
The water charge could be raised liberally by the private operators without 
considering the water tariff policy, guaranteeing continued private profits. 
For PAM Jaya, every water charge increase that was not followed by a parallel 
water tariff increase led to a financial shortfall. This brought the government 
to issue a policy that allowed raising the water tariff automatically every six 
months, effective from 23 July 2004 to 2007. Not surprisingly, Jakarta’s water 
tariff has become the highest among other big cities in Indonesia. 
This structure has caused massive financial losses for PAM Jaya. In 2011, when 
the President Director of PAM Jaya proposed contract renegotiation, financial 
loss was evaluated at IDR 154.3 billion, in addition to a decrease in asset 
value from IDR 1.49 trillion before the privatisation to IDR 204.46 billion 
in 2014.11 A letter of support issued by the provincial government of Jakarta 
later assumed all these losses from public money while guaranteeing excessive 
revenue for the private operators despite dismal service quality.
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At the same time, the cooperation agreement gave much leeway to the private 
operators in terms of performance targets. The regulation of performance targets, 
which are important to ensure quality services to citizens, was designed in such 
a way that the private operators could easily evade them. For instance, technical 
targets could be amended from time to time in accordance with the private 
operators’ Financial Projections. The same case applied to the service standards.
Poor private performance, expensive water tariff
With no pressure whatsoever, the private operators’ performance has been 
unsatisfactory. In a recent statement, PAM Jaya explained that the service 
coverage ratio in 2013 was targeted for 66.37 per cent, but the private opera-
tors were only able to reach 59.01 per cent,12 or lower than that of 2008. The 
leakage level is 44 per cent, higher than the average level of other drinking water 
companies nationally, which is 31 per cent.13 The Interior Ministry’s regulation 
specifies that the leakage level should not be higher than 20 per cent.
While receiving poor water services, customers have to pay expensive water 
tariffs. At the beginning of the concession, the average water tariff in Jakarta 
was IDR 1,700/m3. It continued to increase rapidly, mostly through the 
Automatic Tariff Adjustment policy, as the private operators kept pushing 
frequent increases in the water charge. Currently, the average water tariff in 
Jakarta is IDR 7,020/m3, which is much higher compared to that of other big 
cities in Indonesia (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 Comparison of average water tariffs in several big cities, Indonesia (2012)
  City Tariff (per m3)
1 Jakarta IDR 7,020 
2 Surabaya IDR 2,600 
3 Medan IDR 2,294 
4 Bekasi IDR 2,300 
5 Makassar IDR 2,000 
6 Semarang IDR 2,600 
Sources: (1), (2), (4) TribunNews 31 January 2012; (3) Bisnis Indonesia 24 September 2012; (5) Department 
of Public Works; (6) Okezone 10 May 2012.
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Water supply challenges in Jakarta
In a heavily populated city like Jakarta (9.6 million inhabitants), providing 
safe drinking water through a piped network is no simple task. In the context 
of rapidly increasing demand, the piped water infrastructure supplies 297 mil-
lion cubic meters of water per year. Additional water needs tax groundwater 
resources, and excessive exploitation is causing environmental problems such 
as land subsidence and saltwater intrusion. Besides, use of Jakarta’s ground-
water is a serious public health concern because it is vastly contaminated with 
E-coli (as much as 90 per cent14).
Most residents use groundwater because piped water services cover less than 
half of the population. This unserved population is mostly composed of 
poor communities, in North and West Jakarta for example. In these neigh-
bourhoods, residents have to buy water in jerry cans at a cost as high as 
IDR 15,000/day (US$1.15), while daily income is generally less than IDR 
30,000.15 Even more dismal is sanitation coverage that stagnates at a low 5 
per cent, accelerating environmental degradation.16
In taking back the responsibility for water services, public utility PAM Jaya 
will have to tackle these daunting challenges.
Public water works better in Indonesia
With ever deepening problems, Jakarta has no other realistic options than 
terminating the water privatisation contract and bringing back services to 
PAM Jaya. In Indonesia, public water management is proven to perform better 
than privatised utilities. Water services in cities such as Surabaya, Palembang, 
Banjarmasin, Medan and Malang, which are fully managed by public entities, 
perform far better than Jakarta’s and at lower water tariffs (see Table 2.2). 
In taking over the water services from the private operators, three possible sce-
narios have been considered: 1) PAM Jaya buys the private operators’ shares; 
2) the governor declares through a decree that the contracts are unilaterally 
terminated; 3) the citizen lawsuit leads the court to nullify the contract agree-
ments and water management returns back to PAM Jaya. After the court’s 
decision of March 2015, the city administration is eager to pursue the third 
option. The governor hopes that an expected private operator attempt in 
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appealing the court decision will be rejected. At the same time, the city ad-
ministration’s legal bureau is also preparing in case that the private operators 
resort to international arbitrage.17
Table 2.2 Comparison of water utilities performance in several cities, Indonesia
  Water utilities
Average  
water tariff
Leakage level 
(%)
Service  
coverage (%)
1 Surabaya 2,800 34 87
2 Palembang 3,800 30 93
3 Banjarmasin 4,120 26 98
4 Medan 2,226 24 66.62
5 Malang 4,000 30 80
6 Jakarta 7,800 44 59.01
Sources: (1) The Indonesian Drinking Water Association (Perpamsi) 2013; (2) TribunNews 2013; (3) Department 
of Public Works 2013; (4) Perpamsi 2010; (5) Malang Drinking Water Company 2015; (6) JPNN 2013.
Towards remunicipalisation: Financing 
Should the governor decide to follow the initial plan for PAM Jaya to buy 
Palyja’s shares, PAM Jaya needs to gather sufficient funds for the repurchase. 
In early 2015, PAM Jaya stated that if the share purchase were to take place, it 
would consider assistance from banks.18 PAM Jaya, however, still has another 
alternative through internal financing if public water management can gener-
ate enough savings through enhanced efficiency due to the merger of two 
contracts into one sole public operator.
Based on Amrta Institute’s estimation, the efficiency gains from terminating 
the privatisation contract could yield as much as IDR 171 billion. These 
savings would come from the reduction of operational costs compared to the 
private operators’, costs which were previously borne by PAM Jaya through 
the water charge. After privatisation is ended, PAM Jaya will be free from the 
water charge scheme and will be able to stop accounting costs not related with 
water production.19 
For instance, there would be no more costs for “technical assistance”, which in 
the Jakarta contracts refers to the fees paid to shareholders every year. Under 
public management, administrative fees will be reduced significantly. Salary 
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costs will go down too as expensive foreign executives will no longer need to be 
paid. Direct public management has a significant advantage on costs of insur-
ance and rent for buildings. Travel, external consulting services, advertising will 
be reduced dramatically compared to the amount spent by private operators.
Public-public partnership as a way forward
Furthermore, the next task for PAM Jaya in the post-privatisation period 
would be to rethink water management to improve services. The public 
water utility could benefit from external expertise through a partnership with 
another public institution, known as public-public partnership (PuP).
A PuP is “collaboration between two or more public authorities or organisa-
tions, based on solidarity, to improve the capacity and effectiveness of one 
partner in providing public water or sanitation services. They have been de-
scribed as: “a peer relationship forged around common values and objectives, 
which exclude profit-seeking.”20
As mentioned above, a number of public water utilities in Indonesia have 
outstanding performances. PuPs would give an opportunity for PAM Jaya to 
work together with other good water utilities such as in Surabaya, Palembang, 
Banjarmasin, Medan, Malang, and even with foreign public water utilities, in 
the areas of “training and developing human resources, technical support on a 
wide range of issues, improving efficiency and building institutional capacity, 
financing water services, and improving participation.”21
The priority objectives of such an initiative would be to improve its basic 
performance on service coverage and to reduce leakage. PAM Jaya has set to 
achieve the goal to increase water coverage to 80 per cent in 2015, which at 
current production rates would amount to a 10,999 liter/second deficit, and to 
97 per cent in 2030, which will create 22,636 liter/second of water production 
deficit. Teaming up with a public water utility that has proven to be able to 
boost service coverage and reduce leakage level could bring the experience, 
skills, and technology necessary to up production considerably.
A PuP could eventually be an opportunity for public operators to work to-
gether to achieve ambitious goals. The people of Jakarta should receive drink-
able water, and serious efforts to boost sanitation coverage must be made. 
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Chapter Three
German municipalities  
take back control of water
By Christa Hecht 
In Germany, water has traditionally been owned and managed by the mu-
nicipalities. Since the Middle Ages, there have existed public associations to 
carry out irrigation and drainage operations. In the 19th century, corporations 
and cooperatives were formed to ensure water management and wastewater 
removal in the growing industrial centres, mainly to prevent epidemics. 
Today, there are more than 12,000 water and land associations, water and 
wastewater associations, and dike and sluice associations in Germany. In ad-
dition to water supply and wastewater treatment, they are also responsible for 
the preservation of water resources under the EU Water Framework Directive. 
An estimated 6,060 water operators deliver clean tap water to citizens and 
there are over 6,900 wastewater operators.
Water governance is based on local working units that are close to users. 
Sustainable management of water resources for future generations and envi-
ronmental protection are key principles. 
Municipalities are responsible for providing citizens with drinking wa-
ter and wastewater removal as public services of general interest (named 
Daseinsvorsorge). Local governments have the competence to determine the 
organisational form of water management. Smaller towns often join mu-
nicipal associations to provide water and/or sanitation services and benefit 
from such inter-municipal cooperation. The right of self-government of the 
municipalities is protected by the German Constitution. 
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Municipalities can use several organisational and legal forms for water supply 
and wastewater removal in Germany:
• Government-operated system
• Municipal Company or Public Law Company (PLC)
• Special-purpose association 
• Water and land association
• Special legal association in North-Rhine-Westphalia
• Other forms of inter-municipal cooperation
• Public-private partnership 
• Concession/operational contract with a private company
Table 3.1 Water management in Germany (2014)
Legal structure Wastewater treatment Water supply
Public service legal structures 92% 64%
Public companies/municipal 
companies (PLC/Ltd. Co)
(28% associations  
and inter-municipal 
cooperation)
(23% associations  
and inter-municipal 
cooperation)
Public-private partnerships 21%
Other private companies 8% 15%
Source: Branchenbild der Deutschen Wasserwirtschaft 2011 and own research.
From the 1950s to the 1990s 
After the Second World War water management developed in different ways 
in the East and West. In the Federal Republic of Germany (West), the histori-
cally decentralised structure survived with the constitutional protection of 
local self-government. In the German Democratic Republic (East), the water 
sector was centralised in departments for ground and surface water and for 
urban water management oriented on river basins and government districts 
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with 15 large state-owned utilities. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
reunification the latter were decentralised and the utilities and their water 
network infrastructure were handed over to the municipalities. 
Through this process the German states in the eastern part of the country 
wrote clauses into their new federal laws to open up for private investments 
in the water sector, allowing concessions, operation agreements and public-
private partnerships. As a result, some full-fledged privatisations and partial 
ones took place in the 1990s in the former eastern part of Germany. On the 
western side of the country some privatisations had already taken place begin-
ning in the 1980s in financially stressed municipalities.
While in the 1980s and 1990s advocates of privatisation promised greater 
efficiency and better service from the private sector, the traction of these 
arguments in favour of privatisation has now faded completely. These days 
Germans equate privatisation with higher rates for users, while profits soar for 
the private operators. Studies have indeed demonstrated that after privatisa-
tion prices for water services generally increased.1 
Politicians have had to acknowledge that in the public water management sec-
tor the knowledge and experience of engineers, scientists or technical experts 
was at least as valuable as in the private industry. When it comes to taking 
social and environmental concerns seriously in the planning of infrastructure, 
to setting tariff pricing and to using the resources responsibly, they now see 
that the public water sector is also clearly superior. 
Public water operators also tend to be of great significance to the regional 
economy because they often concentrate their investments in local small 
and medium-size companies for infrastructure and maintenance works – 
contrary to private operators who tend to contract out work exclusively to 
their subsidiaries.
In 2007 the Alliance of Public Water Associations (AöW) was founded by 
public water operators to fight against privatisation and to lobby for public 
management. In the last few years, there has been significant progress towards 
achieving these objectives. Since 2012, at least six German cities have decided 
to remunicipalise water services. 
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Key remunicipalisations in Germany 
Berlin 
In 1999 the Berlin House of Representatives approved the Senate proposal 
to sell 49.9 per cent of Berlin Wasser Holding AG to a consortium of private 
German and French companies. RWE Aqua GmbH and Vivendi (now Veolia 
Wasser GmbH) bought the shares for €1,679 billion. This was preceded by 
tense discussions and a largely unsuccessful complaint filed by two members’ 
groups of the Berlin Parliament before the state’s Constitutional Court. 
Nonetheless, the project went ahead, negatively affecting the 3.5 million 
residents of the German capital. The main terms of this partial privatisation 
included: a four-year exclusion from any increases in tariffs, a ban on layoffs 
until 2014 as negotiated with the trade union2 and a level of investments of 
€2.5 billion for the first 10 years (€250 million per year). The state of Berlin also 
guaranteed profits for the private investors; if the profit targets were not met, 
it would be obliged to make up for the difference by drawing from its budget. 
The contract was signed until 2028.
Additional terms of the contract secured a decisive influence for the investors 
on the Management Board, even though they did not have a majority of shares. 
They included the expansion of activities in the German and international 
telecommunications and water markets and creating 700 new jobs in subsidiary 
companies by 2009. The partial privatisation of Berlin’s water utility (Berliner 
Wasserbetriebe) was intended to become a flagship for successful privatisation. 
However, by 2004 water prices had increased in roughly 35 per cent.3 Between 
1999 and 2011 the private investors banked €1,526 billion in profits, equivalent 
to a 7 per cent annual profit rate relative to purchase price.4 The revenues to 
the state of Berlin increased, but the €365 million of its possible share of profit 
were not accessed. The cause is not explained.5 Despite high profits, the invest-
ments in infrastructure decreased after 2009 and in 2013 a study showed an 
investment gap compared to planned spending.6 Due to financial losses in its 
international activities, Berlin’s water operator reduced these activities and they 
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will be stopped completely in the future. The exclusion of layoffs for employees 
was extended until 2020.
Popular discontent with the high prices of water fuelled political debate and 
voices emerged against the privatisation. A referendum proposal was pushed 
forward by the citizens’ initiative Berliner Wassertisch (Berlin Water Table) in 
2011 to demand transparency on the terms of the privatisation contract, which 
had been kept secret until then. The initiative was supported by 98.2 per cent 
of voters. A few days after this referendum the contracts were published online 
by the Berliner Wasserbetriebe. Berlin citizens saw the favourable conditions 
the private investors had guaranteed for themselves as the main reason why the 
water price had increased so much.
Moreover in 2012 the German Federal Cartel Office ordered Berlin’s water 
utility to lower the water price in 18 per cent due to what it considered to 
be abusive pricing. A comparative analysis of the Cartel Office showed that 
the price was significantly higher than in comparable companies (they are all 
publicly owned).
In 2012 Berlin bought back the shares from RWE Aqua GmbH for €654 
million and in 2013, the shares from Veolia for €590 million. To do so the city 
of Berlin took a loan that must now be repaid through water bills (and thus 
citizens) over a period of 30 years.
Since the buy-back, investments in infrastructure have increased and the price 
for wastewater treatment was lowered too. 
Rostock 
In 1993 the urban water and wastewater systems of the city of Rostock and 
the 29 surrounding municipalities were privatised through a 25-year contract 
with Eurawasser Nord GmbH (originally part of the Suez Group). Some 
200,000 residents and 320 staff were affected. 
The municipalities have decried the lack of transparency ever since and their 
inability to influence the private operator. Compared to other cities, prices 
are roughly 20 per cent higher, but this does not translate into higher quality 
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services or significant reinvestment in the water systems. The utility was sold 
in 2011 to Remondis Group by the first private owner and the affected mu-
nicipalities did not have a say. 
In 2014 the City Council of Rostock decided to cancel the contract at the end 
of the term in 2018, in consultation with the 29 other municipalities. After 
this decision, Eurawasser Nord GmbH stopped sponsoring events and sport-
ing clubs in the city. In the coming years, difficult negotiations are expected 
for the transfer of water management from the private investor to a new public 
company.
Stuttgart 
In 2002, Stuttgart, a city with 613,392 inhabitants in the south of Germany, 
fully privatised the water supply by contracting EnBW Regional, a subsidiary 
of EnBW AG (exchange-listed stock corporation). 
Citizens in Stuttgart led a strong public campaign for some years. In 2010 the lo-
cal citizens’ initiative Wasserforum successfully collected 27,000 signatures for a 
referendum on remunicipalisation. At the 17 June 2010 City Council meeting, 
Stuttgart decided to terminate the contract with EnBW Regional at the end of 
December 2013. Following this decision EnBW Regional decided to increase 
the price for the water service in 2012. The City of Stuttgart has appealed the 
court against this increase, but a judgement has not yet been rendered.
After Stuttgart’s decision to remunicipalise the water works, a major conflict 
over the repurchase price of the water network erupted. The city is willing 
to pay €150 million, whereas EnBW AG wants to sell at €600 million. Now 
the management of water supply by EnBW Regional was extended until this 
conflict about the water price increase and the repurchase price is resolved.
Lessons learned
Selling away the municipal silverware during financial crunches is not a good 
solution. Municipalities end up making themselves vulnerable to blackmail 
by private investors.
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The contracts are usually designed in favour of private investors and any buy-
back is very expensive for the citizens. In Germany, citizens have paid as much 
as twice or triple the combined value of utilities and infrastructure, although 
all along they were the ones to finance these through water charges.
The message to mayors and members of city councils is to steer clear of 
privatisation.
Christa Hecht has been General Manager of the Alliance of 
Public Water Associations (AöW) in Berlin since March 2010. 
Previously, she worked at the Department of Women’s Affairs in 
the City of Frankfurt/Main before joining the German Union 
for Public Services as the Managing Director, Vice-President 
for Hessen. In the water sector she was a member of the Board 
of Directors of the Berliner Wasserbetriebe from 1999 to 2003.
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Chapter four
Turning the page on water 
privatisation in France
By Christophe Lime 
France is home to the leading water multinationals and is one of the few 
countries in the world to have given private companies a predominant role in 
managing water and sanitation services. Its particular type of concession and 
lease contracts (délégation de service public) has been both promoted by the 
private sector as a model to replicate across the world, and reviled by others 
as the epitome of water privatisation and its ills. Recently, however, there 
have been several large-scale cases of remunicipalisation of water services in 
France, including in Paris in 2010. This shift back to public management is a 
significant breakthrough in a landscape that was once largely dominated by 
the private sector. France Eau Publique is a national network of public water 
operators created to foster the sharing of experiences and expertise and to 
promote public water management to counter the lobbying of private water 
companies.
A fragmented landscape
In France, water supply and sanitation services fall under the jurisdiction of 
city councils, which can either provide these services themselves (25 per cent 
provide water services and over 40 per cent, sanitation) or transfer them to 
an inter-communal body. Such bodies are growing in importance. There are 
some large water services that serve large populations of more than 1 million 
people, such as Eau de Paris, the Interdepartmental Syndicate for Sanitation of 
Greater Paris (SIAAP), the Water Syndicate of Île-de-France (SEDIF), Grand 
Lyon, Marseille Provence Métropole and Lille Métropole Europe. However, 
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for the most part, water and sanitation services in France remain very small: 
9,500 water and 13,500 sanitation providers (mainly municipal) serve less 
than 2,000 inhabitants; only 75 water and 100 sanitation providers serve more 
than 100,000 inhabitants.
Local authorities choose between public and private 
management 
When it comes to public services, under French law water and sanitation 
services are considered of an “industrial and commercial nature” and the 
competent local authority may choose between:
• Managing the service directly through a “régie”, which is either financial-
ly autonomous and legally integrated with the local council or financially 
and legally autonomous, operating at arm’s length from the council. 
• Delegating management to an external company, usually private under 
a fixed-term contract called délégation de service public (DSP, “public 
service delegation”). This is not exactly a “privatisation” in the narrow 
sense of selling publicly owned assets, since the water system remains the 
property of the council, which may also decide to modify or terminate 
the contract unilaterally before its term (but usually not without paying 
hefty compensation, as illustrated below).
Since 2010, a new law gives councils another option: Local Public Companies 
(sociétés publiques locales, SPL). These are public limited companies governed 
by private law, but whose shareholders are two local councils or more. They 
must operate for the sole benefit of the shareholding councils; as such they can 
be considered a form of public management.
Opposition to outsourcing water services 
There was a marked increase in delegation contracts and outsourcing to pri-
vate companies during the 1970s and 1980s in France, as well as substantial 
consolidation among private companies providing water and sanitation ser-
vices. This consolidation led to the constitution of three major private groups, 
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with stakes in other local services (waste management, heating, parking, food 
services) and in the construction sector: Veolia (formerly Générale des Eaux, 
Vivendi), Suez Environment (formerly Lyonnaise des Eaux) and SAUR. The 
proportion of the French population served by a private operator eventually 
peaked at the turn of the millennium at more than 70 per cent for water supply 
and about 55 per cent for sanitation.
Delegation contracts became the dominant management model in the ab-
sence of competition requirements and because of the widespread practice 
of enticing councils with “entry fees” (large sums paid at the onset of private 
contracts) – and in some cases because of outright corruption. The associated 
tariff increases and high profit margins (often hidden in unspent “provisions” 
or “guarantees” for network renewal) highlighted by council-commissioned 
audits, auditors’ courts and citizen groups, and several cases of proven or 
alleged corruption led French lawmakers to introduce new regulations in 
1993. Law No. 93-122 on the prevention of corruption and transparency in 
economic life and public procedures – the so-called “loi Sapin” updated several 
times since – required competitive awarding of contracts, prohibited “entry 
fees” and any form of payment or service provision outside the contract’s pur-
pose, capped the duration of contracts to 20 years (with exceptions), limited 
the use of “additional clauses” and set reporting obligations, among others.
Twenty years on, the rate of contract renewal for private providers remains 
high and stable (87 per cent on average, with a 0.3 per cent drop per year since 
1998, excluding remunicipalisations). For long, competition among private 
providers was virtually inexistent, its sole engines being a small number of 
independent companies that survived consolidation in the water sector and 
the “threat” of remunicipalisation. However, since 2009-2010, there are signs 
of increased competition between the large private operators, but it largely 
focuses on prices and takes the form of extensive internal restructuring to 
achieve a “low cost” service, resulting in a decline in service quality. This 
change can be partly explained by the trend towards greater control of water 
and sanitation services by local councils, whether they choose to renew the 
outgoing provider or not.
Turning the page on water privatisation in France
61
Despite these positive developments, asymmetry of information remains part 
and parcel of service outsourcing. There is little transparency particularly when 
it comes to financial reporting, with private providers drafting their annual 
reports based on allocation assumptions unrelated to actual expenses. At 
the same time, in the long history of outsourcing, small and medium-sized 
councils have too often lost the in-house expertise necessary to monitor and 
control the proper implementation of contracts (a role that cannot be replaced 
by external auditors).
Lastly, delegation-type contracts are characterised by a lack of flexibility and 
adaptability to changes in the scope and organisation of water and sanita-
tion services (particularly in relation to the development of inter-communal 
management bodies). Even if the average duration of such contracts has been 
significantly reduced (11 years on average since 1998), it still amounts to 
nearly two local electoral mandates.
Amendments to the original contracts are usually possible, but local coun-
cils rarely have the higher hand when it comes to negotiating such amend-
ments, while unilateral modification or termination can prove extremely 
costly because it usually involves compensating the private providers for the 
unamortised portion of investments incurred and sometimes even for “lost 
profits”. The latter compensation scenario is highly questionable, especially 
when providers have been reporting budget deficits for years and suddenly 
claim that they will lose profits if their contract is terminated...
Return to public management 
Over the last 20 years, all of these factors have led a growing number of 
councils in France to challenge the very principle of “public service delega-
tion” and to choose a return to public management, the first cases being the 
Tursan Water Syndicate in 1995, SIVOM Durance Luberon in 1997, and 
Grenoble in 2000 against the backdrop of criminal prosecutions and strong 
media attention. But given the “contractual inertia” mentioned above, ac-
tual remunicipalisation has often been delayed (unilateral terminations 
are rare). 
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It is only since the mid-2000s that there has been a significant trend towards 
a return of water and sanitation services to public management. Public water 
management has been “gaining” about 1 per cent on average every year since 
2008 (in terms of population covered). Water remunicipalisation in Paris, 
initiated in 2003 but not completed until 2010, was a flagship case in this 
regard and has inspired other policy-makers. 
Today the remunicipalisation movement brings together councils of all sizes, 
from “small” towns of a few thousand inhabitants (such as Neufchâteau, 
Venelles, Varages, Embrun and Digne-les-Bains) to large cities or syndicates 
(such as Brest Métropole Océane, the agglomeration of Aubagne-Pays de 
l’Étoile, Rennes). Remunicipalisation took effect at the beginning of 2015 
in Nice Côte d’Azur and should be a reality in Montpellier Méditerranée 
Métropole in 2016.
It should be noted that the very term “remunicipalisation” of water and sanita-
tion services is not always entirely appropriate. On the one hand, an increasing 
number of services are no longer managed at the municipal level, having been 
taken on at the inter-communal level. On the other hand, some cities have 
never had public water management, such as Rennes whose water services have 
been privately managed since the late 19th century or Nice where Veolia has 
been providing water for 151 years.
Furthermore, with the rise in inter-communal cooperation and the resulting 
reorganisation of water and sanitation services, all remunicipalisations do 
not result in the creation of a new régie (or SPL). Several inter-communal 
bodies have expanded their service area upon the expiry of smaller delegation 
contracts, as the Urban Community of Cherbourg did (approximately 35,000 
new users in 2002) and the Metropolitan Rouen Normandie (about 100,000 
new users since 2011). And let us not forget that large, predominantly rural 
régies have been expanding their service area for 50 years by integrating already 
existing régies or councils, which had previously outsourced their services. 
Primarily rural services such as Noréade in the North of France, the Alsace-
Moselle SDEA and the Vienne Water Syndicate are among the largest public 
water services in France today.
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Key issues and challenges
The experience of dozens of successful remunicipalisations of water and/or 
sanitation services in France demonstrates that returning to public manage-
ment is both desirable and feasible, including for small councils. There are 
important lessons and recommendations that can be drawn:
• The need for political “champions” is absolutely essential: by definition, 
public management involves stronger accountability by officials and 
employees; the active involvement of politicians is therefore critical. 
• Remunicipalisation can create legitimate concerns and hurdles (espe-
cially when councils no longer have strong in-house expertise), and the 
active support of peers (officials or managers) from other councils that 
have already returned to public management – or from long-standing 
régies – is an undeniable advantage.
• Anticipation and preparation are important. Although some new régies 
were created quickly after contract termination (e.g. Castres established a 
special team to create its régie and take over the management of water and 
sanitation services in less than six months), experience shows that there is 
a lot of benefit in initiating preliminary studies at least two years before 
contract expiry (or even longer for larger services), and in separating the 
issue of contract liquidation (which is often insufficiently addressed in 
the drafting of contracts) from that of setting up a new public operator, 
because they require a different set of skills and expertise. It can also be 
difficult to choose one or more consultants for project management 
assistance that are sufficiently competent and independent; feedback 
from other councils is an important contribution in this regard.
• Integrating employees of the former private provider requires great care. 
As their knowledge of the water network and service is comprehensive, 
it is critical to attract them to the new public provider and, if possible, 
to involve them in the remunicipalisation project. Maintaining existing 
wage conditions is now standard practice, although it may be neces-
sary to simplify and streamline the various employment conditions 
accumulated over the years. We have found that employees (if not top 
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executives) are generally willing to join remunicipalised operators. They 
tend to appreciate the fact that their work becomes more focused on 
public service values and the common good, which are often under-
mined by private operators’ fixation with profitability and market com-
petition. The main difficulty lies in establishing the list of employees 
to be transferred in such a way that the new entity can take over the 
service without being encumbered by surplus staff or employees with 
unsuitable profiles. To achieve this, a process of social negotiation is 
recommended, involving elected councillors, labour representatives 
and managers, in order to agree on a framework agreement as soon as 
possible.
• Lastly, given that information and communication technologies are 
becoming increasingly sophisticated and indispensable, the transfer of 
data and information systems (supervision of works, client manage-
ment, asset management, etc.) should be as high a priority as transfer-
ring equipment.
While each situation is unique and one council’s experience is never identical 
to another’s, exchanges are always positive and contribute to managing change 
better. This is why France Eau Publique offers local authorities wishing to 
return to public management a “sponsorship” programme that brings them 
support from one or several councils that share the same characteristics and 
have already gone through a remunicipalisation process. 
Beyond remunicipalisation, councils and their public operators must con-
stantly seek to improve their performance. Committed to the twin principles 
of cooperation and solidarity – versus commercial competition – the members 
of France Eau Publique can pool their knowledge, expertise and best practices, 
develop synergies and share tools to serve the common good and build sustain-
able water services.
Lastly, the cause of public water management needs to be promoted and 
defended against the powerful lobbying of private operators. Policy-makers 
need to hear that outsourcing water services to private operators does not 
guarantee better performance, neither from an operational (technical, service 
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quality, etc.) nor an economic point of view. Most public providers can offer 
quality water, safe services and environmentally friendly orientations.
Christophe Lime is President of France Eau Publique  
and deputy Mayor of Besançon.
France Eau Publique brings together councils and public operators that are 
members of the National Federation of Contracting Councils and Régies (FNCCR 
in its French acronym) and that wish to share knowledge and experience, seek 
mutual support and promote public water management. France Eau Publique is 
an extension of FNCCR’s earlier “conseil d’orientation des régies” and of the work 
conducted within the Aqua Publica Europea network.
For the members of France Eau Publique, the performance imperatives of public 
water management must serve the public good, not private interests. Members 
consider public water management as the sole guarantor of transparent, 
sustainable and civic-minded services, of public assets, and of water resources.
France Eau Publique has four main objectives:
* Develop synergies and exchange good practices and contacts between 
experts and representatives of public operators;
* Foster mutual emulation, to demonstrate the excellence of  
public management;
* Support emerging public operators by providing ongoing assistance,  
helping them to succeed and strengthening the collective momentum;
* Gradually constitute a counterweight to the lobbying of the large private 
corporations, in order to promote public management and its values.
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Chapter five
Taking stock of 
remunicipalisation in Paris:  
A conversation with Anne Le Strat
By Olivier Petitjean
France’s Regional Court of Auditors recently published two reports: an assessment 
of Paris’s water policy and an audit on the performance of remunicipalised public 
water utility Eau de Paris. These were the first official evaluations of water services 
since the 2010 flagship return to public management in the capital. As such, the stakes 
were high for the future of the debate on public versus private management of water 
in France. Both reports turned out to be generally very positive on Eau de Paris. Is it 
an implicit endorsement of the remunicipalisation?
The report does not directly seek to compare current public management with 
the performance of the former private providers Suez and Veolia. To make this 
kind of comparison, one needs to go back to previous reports by the Court of 
Auditors on water management in Paris, particularly that of 2000, just before 
we took over the Paris council. It’s like night and day! These reports are often 
quite critical as they are meant to identify gaps to encourage local governments 
to improve public management. All things considered, the recent reports on 
water in Paris were actually extremely positive.
The second report of the Regional Court of Auditors does stress that the return to public 
management enabled Paris to lower the price of water while maintaining a high level 
of investment. 
That is correct, and it is rewarding to see it acknowledged by the Court of 
Auditors. The report on Paris’s broader water policy is even more positive than 
the one focused on the transition to public management because it endorses 
the main strategic directions we have given to this policy. This includes those 
decisions that were initially met with scepticism among the administrative 
services of the council, for instance keeping the non-potable water network1 
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and developing it for use in public gardens, for street cleaning, etc. The report 
also commends the Paris administration for its implementation of a water 
policy that goes beyond the smaller water cycle and takes into account issues 
of water conservation, sustainability and democracy.
So all in all, the return to public management of water in Paris seems like a resounding 
success?
Eau de Paris enjoys a good reputation, and rightly so. It works! We have 
lowered the price of water while maintaining an ambitious investment pro-
gramme over the long term, and our governance is very innovative in many 
ways. Some of our innovations are even adopted by private companies.
This is interesting to note, because private companies keep claiming that they are the 
“innovators”... What kind of “innovation” are you talking about? 
Eau de Paris is the only water operator that has its staff, users and civic as-
sociations represented on the Board, with full voting rights. It is a democratic 
breakthrough that has inspired others. Representation of users on the Board is 
something that is now being openly considered by Antoine Frérot, the CEO 
of Veolia; this would have been inconceivable a few years ago. Eau de Paris 
was also a trailblazer on issues such as gender equality at work; protecting 
water resources through partnerships with farmers to protect water quality 
upstream; water conservation, with extensive distribution of “water conserva-
tion kits”. In the technical realm, we have also been very innovative in terms of 
user services (call centre, monitoring leaks, managing letters and complaints, 
etc). This is why Eau de Paris has been awarded the prize for “best customer 
service” in water distribution in France for the last three years.
Despite the Regional Court of Auditors’ very positive account of water management in 
Paris, when the reports were made public the French media seem to have only picked 
up on one aspect: the likelihood of a future water price increase in Paris. Why is it so?
First, it should be noted that not all media focus on the negative aspects. Some 
media emphasised how positive the reports actually were. That said, some 
media chose to focus their headlines on a possible future increase in the price 
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of water. Obviously these journalists did not take the time to read the whole 
report, and one might question their objectivity. Private corporations are an 
important source of advertising revenue, and it was mostly those outlets that 
are heavily dependent on advertising that hammered on this issue. 
In any case, the reality is that Eau de Paris is confronted, like most water services 
in France and Europe, with the so-called problem of “price scissors”: on the one 
hand, revenue from billing tends to decrease because of lower water consump-
tion; on the other hand, costs keep going up, mainly because of new water 
treatment standards. This trend is not related to the debate on public versus 
private management of water, and is not specific to Eau de Paris. In fact, Eau de 
Paris is comparatively in a pretty good financial situation to face these changes. 
But it’s true that eventually Eau de Paris will probably have to increase its prices 
to balance its budget, like other water services. For me, the fundamental issue 
should be how the water service is financed: it’s no longer possible to fund water 
services solely through a consumption-based tariff calculated from a set price per 
cubic meter of water. This is all the more true if the utility’s policy is to encourage 
users to reduce their consumption of water, as is the case for Eau de Paris.
What is the solution to keep water services affordable for users?
We should differentiate between types of water usage in Paris, notably com-
mercial and domestic. Commercial users should be charged more. Today, 
commercial users (such as cafes, restaurants, hairdressers, dry cleaners, den-
tists, etc) are actually paying less for their water than households, because they 
can deduct this expense from their tax bill. It is a politically sensitive issue and 
it would not be an easy policy to implement from a technical point of view 
either, but I think it would create a fairer system.
Transition
Can you talk about the complexity of the transition to public management, and how 
it has been managed?
It is true that the transition was complex. One must recall that before the 
creation of Eau de Paris, we had three distinct contracts for water: one for 
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water production with a “société d’économie mixte” whose majority shareholder 
was the city government, while Suez and Veolia had minority shares;2 and two 
separate contracts for water distribution with Suez and Veolia, for the city’s left 
and right banks respectively. It was a very complex situation, and there was no 
real precedent on which to build. We encountered a number of difficulties in 
taking back the service in-house, for example with the transition from private 
to public sector accounting systems. But these difficulties have now been 
overcome, as the report from the Court of Auditors highlights.
How difficult was it to integrate former employees of Suez and Veolia into the new 
public entity?
The French labour code allowed for the transfer of the technicians who worked 
on the distribution network, but most of Suez and Veolia executives were 
transferred within these companies just before remunicipalisation. There were 
negotiations to reach a social agreement on harmonisation of wage conditions 
for all staff. But the remunicipalisation was sometimes perceived as a merger of 
the two former distributors (subsidiaries of Suez and Veolia) into the publicly 
managed production side (the former “société d’économie mixte”), which was a 
source of frustration for some formerly private employees. These are common 
problems with such restructuring. Building a common culture takes time.
Did Veolia and Suez try to create obstacles?
That much is clear. This is something I will talk about in my forthcoming 
book, and it is also recounted in some detail in Agnes Sinai’s book about the 
remunicipalisation process: L’eau à Paris, retour vers le public.3 Nevertheless, 
there was a sharp difference between Suez, which remained relatively construc-
tive, and Veolia, which really tried to make our task as difficult as possible.
Are water services now entirely provided by Eau de Paris, or are there still some aspects 
of the service that are outsourced to the private sector?
There is no service “delegation” to the private sector any more. We signed 
transitional outsourcing contracts for managing information systems over 
the first two years, so that Eau de Paris would have time to set up its own 
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information system. Information systems are an incredibly important issue 
because they are used for billing, for water meter data collection and man-
agement, and for monitoring maintenance works, but this issue is too often 
overlooked. Eau de Paris currently controls and manages its own information 
system, but remains semi-dependent on Suez and Veolia, as some of their 
proprietary software is still being used to process the information. A study is 
underway within Eau de Paris to break off this dependency completely. Even 
today, when we request some purely technical information from Veolia, it 
can be hard to get it. 
There is still another contract with Veolia, which is a simple outsourcing 
contract and not a service delegation, for water meter management (instal-
lation and maintenance). Again, Eau de Paris is currently looking at taking 
over this task internally.
The Paris Water Observatory
What was the initial idea behind the creation of the Paris Water Observatory?
The aim of the Paris Water Observatory is to establish a space for citizen 
oversight and information, and to make the elected representatives of the City 
of Paris, its administration and the employees of Eau de Paris accountable to 
citizens. All acts, reports and official proceedings related to water management 
must be submitted to the Observatory before they are considered by the Paris 
Council. Initially, people were sceptical, but now they see the benefit. The 
Observatory is not just another so-called citizen committee that only rubber-
stamps decisions already made. The Observatory does not have decision-
making powers but citizens’ views are taken into account and, perhaps more 
importantly, all the information is made available in an accessible way.
This is also why Eau de Paris integrated both non-profit organisations and a 
representative of the Water Observatory on its Board, with voting rights. The 
Council staff may not always be happy with this because it may take them 
more time to explain issues or to get their points across... But ultimately it 
leads to greater water democracy, and this is good for public management.
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Is there any equivalent elsewhere?
Grenoble has created a users’ committee, which is consulted on the price of 
water. Viry-Châtillon (Lacs de l’Essonne) also has an open governance model 
with a strong role for civil society, inspired by what is happening in Paris. But 
overall the Paris Water Observatory has no real equivalent. Most public opera-
tors are reluctant to open up their governance to users and civic associations 
because it is seen as time-consuming and resource-intensive. Yet I think it is 
essential for a quality public service. It is these democratic innovations that 
are of most interest to peers from other water services abroad who visit Paris 
in preparation for a return to public management.
Does it involve a great number of people?
The Observatory has enabled a number of people to build knowledge on water 
issues. They are not necessarily very many, but they come from neighbourhood 
committees, social housing institutions and associations among others. They 
believe in the Observatory and have wide networks and influence among 
Parisians. The consumer and environmental organisations that have a seat 
on the board of Eau de Paris are influential in a similar way: Que Choisir 
and France Nature Environnement are very big organisations, with national 
scope. The return to public management and the creation of the Paris Water 
Observatory have revitalised civil society participation. This is paradoxical 
because when we decided to remunicipalise in the early 2000s, Parisian civil 
society was not very active on the issue of water. We were quite isolated, be-
cause most of the council administration and most of the unions were not 
in favour of a return to public management of water. Now this has changed.
To what extent is the role of the Observatory formalised?
The Paris Water Observatory exists by virtue of an official order from the 
Mayor, as an extra-municipal committee on water policy. It was the Paris 
Council that created the Observatory, not Eau de Paris. It might have been 
possible to set it up as an independent organisation, but what’s interesting 
about an extra-municipal committee is that the City administration is in 
charge of the administrative functions and logistics. As long as the politicians 
give enough power to the Observatory, it is a win-win situation.
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Networking and support for public management 
elsewhere
The Paris remunicipalisation quickly acquired a huge symbolic and political im-
portance both nationally and internationally. You travelled the world to support 
movements against the privatisation of water, and Eau de Paris entered public-public 
partnerships with other public operators worldwide and played a key role in the 
creation of French and European networks of public operators (France Eau Publique 
and Aqua Publica Europea, respectively). When did this global outreach start?
It began quite early, even before the remunicipalisation itself, because I took 
a strong stance in favour of public management. I was often asked to talk 
about the Parisian experience, beginning with the referendum campaign on 
the human right to water in Colombia in 2009, then in Berlin, in Italy, etc. 
The position I found myself in was unusual in that I had both political re-
sponsibilities as an activist, a councillor and deputy mayor, and operational 
responsibilities as the president of the “société d’économie mixte”, and then of 
Eau de Paris. I am also one of the few people to have been around for the whole 
remunicipalisation process from 2001. Over the last 12 years, directors have 
changed, and other politicians have left. And of course, we’re talking about 
Paris, the capital of France, home of the big water multinationals – a huge 
symbol. All of this gave me a very singular outlook.
Eau de Paris is often seen as an “activist” water operator, committed to the promotion 
of public water management. Is this an institutional reality, or did it only reflect your 
personal commitment while you were president?
There are two aspects to this question. On the one hand, there is the active 
promotion of public management and the fight against privatisation – this 
was a personal commitment on my part, rather than an institutional com-
mitment. Within Eau de Paris, most employees are satisfied, but they are not 
activists, and do not want to dedicate their free time to the defence of public 
management, which is perfectly understandable. Eau de Paris is not in itself 
an activist organisation. But there is also the question of public service values, 
and commitment to these values within Eau de Paris. There are people from 
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the private sector who have joined us in this creative venture to build a local 
public service, and who would now find it impossible to go back to narrow 
market-based orientations.
You also played a role in setting up other institutional structures, such as Aqua 
Publica Europea4 and France Eau Publique. Can you tell us about these networks?
Aqua Publica Europea was originally founded by a small group of people 
who shared the idea that it was necessary to defend public management at the 
European level and to create a counterweight to the lobbying of the private 
water sector in Brussels. With regards to France Eau Publique, there already 
existed a committee of public operators, but we wanted to create a French 
branch of Aqua Publica Europea in order to build up our own strength and 
pool our resources. The comparative advantage of a multinational is the ability 
to pool skills, expertise and resources across the whole company. The objective 
of France Eau Publique is to introduce the same kind of mechanisms among a 
large number of public operators, including group purchasing.
What is your view on the progress of public water management in France since 2011?
There’s clearly a positive trend towards remunicipalisation, but it’s not massive. 
There have been significant remunicipalisation cases, including in cities such 
as Nice that have right-wing councils. This is very important because it shows 
that the preference for public services goes beyond political differences (on 
the other side of the political spectrum, some left-wing politicians have had 
a very ambiguous position on this debate). When Eau de Paris returned to 
public management, it was a cause for celebration for many public operators 
in France, because they knew they would no longer be regarded as black sheep. 
And many cities that have maintained privatised services have used the threat 
of remunicipalisation to negotiate better terms with their private providers. 
Suez and Veolia have had to change their contracts, and now they make less 
profit. The burden of proof is reversed: now it is private providers that have to 
convince cities that it is better for them to remain with a private operator than 
to remunicipalise. Given the history of water management in France, this is 
an enormous achievement.
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Until 2014 Anne Le Strat was President of Eau de Paris, 
deputy mayor of Paris in charge of water and sanitation, 
and president of Aqua Public Europea. Since her election to 
the Paris Council in 2001, she has played a key role in the 
remunicipalisation of water services in Paris. 
She was interviewed by French writer and researcher Olivier 
Petitjean, who is currently the chief editor at the Multinationals 
Observatory, an investigative website on French transna-
tional corporations.
Endnotes
1 Paris is one of the few cities in the world to have two water networks, one for drinking 
water and one for non-potable water. 
2 In French law, a “société d’économie mixte” (mixed sector company) is an anonymous 
company that is majority owned by public shareholders, with at least one private 
shareholder. It is often used by local councils to undertake public works or in some 
cases to manage public services.
3 Eau de Paris. 2014. L’eau à Paris, retour vers le public. Second edition, April. 
Paris: Eau de Paris. http://www.eaudeparis.fr/uploads/tx_edpevents/
LivreRemunicipalisation_01.pdf
4 Aqua Publica Europea (APE) brings together publicly owned water and sanitation 
operators, and their national and regional associations, from all over Europe. Its 
members provide water and sanitation services to over 70 million European citizens.
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Chapter six
Remunicipalisation and workers:  
Building new alliances
By Christine Jakob and Pablo Sanchez 
Remunicipalisation is a major political development that is taking shape glob-
ally. It is rooted in the failures of public-private partnerships (PPPs) and of 
privatisation generally speaking. 
After a 20-year privatisation and outsourcing drive in many cities, policy-
makers have started to draw up a balance sheet. Even global financial institu-
tions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have 
acknowledged the mixed effects of privatisation, especially regarding its disap-
pointing technical efficiency and labour productivity.1 There is now increasing 
evidence in the water and waste sectors of an important trend in the opposite 
direction to counter well-documented negative effects on levels of inequality, 
child poverty and other social indicators.2
However, there is very little comparative analysis about the effects of privatisa-
tion on public sector workers. One reason is that workers affected by privatisa-
tion tend to be ‘bought off’ through early retirement schemes, while others 
do not even oppose it. Labour relations change for incoming employees of a 
newly privatised utility, creating a two-tiered system with senior staff keeping 
their privileges negotiated under public ownership.
Public sector workers tend to have higher protection through collective bar-
gaining coverage and are less affected by precarious work. Once the private 
sector takes over, workers being transferred from the previously public em-
ployer may have a competitive advantage within the enterprise. This makes the 
privatisation versus remunicipalisation debate more complex because workers 
and their trade unions are not only concerned with efficiency gains or the 
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public good but need to look broadly at the ‘bread and butter’ issues behind 
such policy options.
On top of that, in some countries of the European Union, the status of public 
service workers and in particular their ability to act through collective bargain-
ing and social dialogue has been undermined during the neoliberal reforms 
that followed the financial crisis. This adds to the complexity of the decision-
making process for labour organisations.
For trade unions, privatisation tends to be bad news in terms of the general 
level of pay and working conditions. However, it would be overly idealistic 
to think that all trade union organisations oppose privatisation in all circum-
stances3 and support public management. This article draws some lessons and 
highlights some avenues for further investigation on remunicipalisation from 
the point of view of workers. As there is scant literature about the employment 
conditions of workers after remunicipalisation, this article tries to modestly 
contribute to a debate that will require further reflection. 
Remunicipalisation under austerity
Each case of remunicipalisation is different because the conditions for taking 
back services in-house depend on the way they were first privatised. So it is 
very difficult to compare the effects of privatisation and remunicipalisation 
on workers. 
However, the debates about remunicipalisation mirror those that took place 
at the end of the 19th century during the expansion of the organised labour 
movement in Europe. The rise of labour and social-democratic organisations 
made the demand for public services very popular among working class people, 
and especially organised workers. The society they envisioned would create 
publicly owned schools, transportation, electricity and water, among others. In 
many countries the rise of this new political force created the municipal model.
The main difference today is that we have a much more integrated global 
economy with transnational service providers, which did not exist during the 
previous wave of municipalisations and nationalisations, and the financing of 
Chapter six
78
the economy is much more subject to speculation and the power of financial 
markets. In that respect it is important for the organised labour movement, and 
the trade union movement in particular, to rediscover a vision of society and 
not just deal with the ‘bread and butter’ concerns of their unionised members.
Local governments are facing budgetary cuts related with austerity policies 
implemented by central governments as well as European and international 
financial institutions. Some cases have made the headlines in France, Spain and 
Greece where it is often argued that public sector workers are “too expensive” or 
that it is difficult to sustain pension funds given the high levels of unemployment. 
Remunicipalisation is an opportunity to rethink the ways public services are 
provided while protecting the living conditions of public sector workers and 
that of the communities they cater for. Remunicipalisation should re-open 
a debate about the values of the public sector: equal access to services for 
all citizens, accountable, democratic and transparent management with a 
decision-making process in which all stakeholders are involved.
In practice: remunicipalisation and the trade union 
movement
Once a remunicipalisation process gets started, workers’ organisations look at 
the way in which working conditions may be affected. There is a need to have 
a full understanding of the proposed legal status for the new utility in order to 
be able to improve the delivery of public services.
One of the first important steps is to look at what labour code will apply after 
the change of ownership because it can have an important impact in terms of 
job creation by the new municipal owner. 
In several concrete cases, such as in France, unions have not openly supported 
remunicipalisation, in particular in the water sector, to avoid undermining 
the level of pay and employment terms and conditions. In the recent remu-
nicipalisation in Montpellier the union movement was split, some trade 
unions having consulted only those employed in the company. Others did 
more comprehensive consultations. In the end those unions communicating 
about the type of company they wanted were key to garnering the necessary 
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support to continue with the process. An employer is normally bound to 
replace the employment contract keeping the same terms and conditions but 
it can start applying different ones to the new employees (due to the change 
in collective agreement). This can certainly be dangerous. So it is important 
for trade unions to discuss with each other what kind of ownership model 
they support and to be united in the remunicipalisation process.
Also the level of social dialogue with the new employer is important. For ex-
ample, how will issues of outsourcing and subcontracting be dealt with in the 
new public structure? Therefore it is important for new employers to explain 
the potential gains for workers but also for trade unions to make the case among 
their individual members that remunicipalisation can create better companies.
This is quite problematic as trade unions tend to represent the interests and 
views of their affiliated (individual) members, not often do they represent 
the views of all workers. This might seem obvious but trade unions in their 
democratic decision-making process will consult those who participate in the 
organisation through paying dues and attending meetings. So it is likely that 
affiliated members have better working conditions and safer ones than others 
working in the subcontracted or outsourced sectors. This ‘divide and rule’ logic 
has been used in different sectors to increase profits for private companies but 
also to undermine labour density. Trade unions need to counter this trend by 
promoting the good of society as a whole and not just their members.
Therefore it is advisable for the trade union movement to see remunicipalisation 
as an opportunity to increase its influence in society and in the labour force as 
a whole.
Remunicipalisation is a reality
Remunicipalisation is defined as taking back municipal services that were previ-
ously under private management, for example under a long-term concession. 
It can also mean bringing regional services back into public ownership. This 
trend has built up over the last 10 years. A recent study4 shows that most remu-
nicipalisation drives are happening in historic municipal sectors such as water 
and sanitation. 
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Despite continued financial and ideological pressures driven by neoliberal 
policies there are clear signs that municipalities in Europe are increasingly 
moving towards remunicipalisation and no longer see privatisation as a vi-
able option. Some European trade union organisations such as the European 
Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU) encourage their affiliates to pro-
mote remunicipalisation in their transnational meetings and through targeted 
research in this area.5
In Germany more and more municipalities are trying to reverse privatisation 
in the energy and gas sector and become themselves producers of energy. Some 
72 new public energy companies have been created in Germany since 2005. 
In addition, more than 1,000 cooperatives active in the energy sector have 
been created. By 2016 over 2,000 concessions in the energy sector will come 
to an end in Germany, announcing a new wave of remunicipalisations. 
A study in 2011 by Leipzig University of over 100 German municipalities con-
cluded that the trend is moving towards greater provision by the public sector. 
Half of the municipalities with budget deficits plan some form of restructuring 
of municipal services, of which 41 per cent are considering moving towards 
inter-municipal cooperation and 36 per cent would opt for remunicipalisa-
tion; less than 3 per cent are considering privatisation.6
However, antitrust authorities and the courts are making it very difficult for 
municipalities to take back their water networks as they are obliged to publicly 
tender and then have to apply themselves to this call. There is currently an 
exemplary case in the municipality of Titisee-Neustadt where the mayor is 
challenging the constitutional court on this issue.
In Medina Sidonia (in the province of Cadiz, Spain), the water sector company 
was transformed into a multi-sectoral local company dealing with public street 
lighting, water, laboratory analysis and waste. The idea is to make econo-
mies of scale in order to generate savings and to create more jobs. The city’s 
waste company was remunicipalised in January 2014 and it has increased its 
workforce in two months by almost 20 per cent.7 At a much bigger scale, the 
remunicipalisation of water in Paris in 2010 has led to the ‘exporting’ of public 
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worker know-how to other public companies trying to build solidarity and 
public-public partnerships.
Last but not least, remunicipalisation has helped to slow down the privatisa-
tion trend elsewhere around the globe. When private utilities are going back 
to public ownership many wonder why they privatised in the first place. This 
has fuelled debates about the benefits and interests behind privatisation that 
very often are linked to aggressive lobbying and corruption. For unions that 
defend a more democratic and transparent society this should be a motivating 
factor to encourage remunicipalisation as an alternative to privatisation.
In France, municipalities and regions continue to remunicipalise water ser-
vices or public transport. Even in the UK, where the national government 
itself is pushing through privatisations in health care and prisons, outsourc-
ing has rarely been used by municipalities, despite having to achieve cuts of 
7 per cent per year: the Financial Times suggested that “local authorities have 
grown skeptical about the savings outsourcing can deliver, as well as fearing a 
backlash against private companies making large profits from the taxpayer.”8
Table 6.1 Recent remunicipalisations in selected European countries
Sector Process Countries Factors
Water Municipalisation of services France, 
Hungary
Private failure, cost, 
control, contract 
expiry
Electricity New stadtwerke, purchase  
of private companies
Germany Private failure, cost, 
control, contract 
expiry
Public 
transport
Municipalisation of contracts 
and concessions
UK, France Cost, private failure, 
public objectives, 
control
Waste  
management
Contracts brought  
in-house, inter-municipal 
incinerators
Germany, UK, 
France, etc.
Cost, control,  
contract expiry
Cleaning Contracts brought in-house UK, Finland Cost, effectiveness, 
employment,  
contract expiry
Source: Hall, D. 2012. Re-municipalising municipal services in Europe. Report commissioned by EPSU to 
PSIRU, May. London: PSIRU. http://www.epsu.org/a/8683 (accessed 23 February 2015).
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Benefits of remunicipalisation
In addition to the reasons that have led municipalities to end privatisation, 
including cost-savings or regaining democratic control, there are numerous 
opportunities for the trade union movement emerging from remunicipalisa-
tion. Remunicipalisation is an opportunity for trade unions to improve working 
conditions. A private company running a long-term concession, especially in 
the water sector, tends to externalise key elements of technical know-how. 
This can be used as a bargaining chip during the renegotiation of the contract 
and it adds to its profitability to convince employers to keep the valuable 
technical knowledge of workers in-house because it is a profitable investment 
over the long-term for all workers. For organised workers the aim should be 
to improve the conditions of all the workers of a company in order to reach a 
level playing field between pay scales and unite rather than divide workers. A 
remunicipalised entity tries to make economies of scale to be able to improve 
employment and wages. This rationalisation can allow achieving broader so-
cial goals by generating discussions with workers on how to run the company 
better. For instance, in the municipality of Almada in Portugal a consultation 
with workers raised awareness on access to water as a basic human right. This 
resulted in an improvement of in-house services and a decision was taken to 
outsource only to local small and medium-sized enterprises.9
The improvement of governance and worker participation in the public company. 
The remunicipalisation process improved the transparency of local service provi-
sion in the cases of Paris, Naples and Hamilton.10 This resulted in a broader consul-
tation with workers newly employed by the local companies. Remunicipalisation 
is not only about the renegotiation of wages and benefits but it also encourages 
consultation with workers on the general performance of a public company. 
Socially responsible companies should include decent work, social dialogue and 
should have at heart workers’ participation.
Trade unions can gain from a better understanding of socially responsible standards 
in municipal companies. A public company with social, environmental and com-
munity goals that consults its workers (and their organisations) can serve as a 
model of progressive management. Further, working for a company that takes 
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into account social goals is more rewarding and motivating for workers. The 
current economic crisis and austerity measures have hit a number of European 
economies. It is essential that the trade union movement exemplify that you can 
make a difference locally if you start with your own workers. Medina Sidonia is 
a good example. The new multi-sectoral municipal company created more jobs 
and improved working conditions to ensure more effective service provision. The 
company also promotes sustainable public procurement with small and medium 
enterprises that are based in the city to maintain local jobs.11 Insourcing can result 
in savings because it increases efficiency. This allows increasing the number of 
workers as Medina Sidonia did.
Remunicipalisation clearly can have major benefits and should be broadly 
supported by the trade union movement.
Christine Jakob is Local and Regional Government Policy 
Officer at the European Federation of Public Service Unions 
(EPSU). 
Pablo Sanchez is Campaigns Coordinator at the European 
Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU). 
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Chapter seven
You are public…now what?  
News ways of measuring success
By David A. McDonald
Congratulations! You’ve just taken back public control of your water services 
after years of privatisation. The struggle was hard, the transition was challeng-
ing, but your public systems are now up and running.
The challenges do not end here, of course. If remunicipalisation is going to 
be effective it will require new ways of thinking about ‘success’ and how water 
services are measured and evaluated.
Undoing the structures and logics of privatisation will take years, possibly 
decades. The ideologies and mechanisms of neoliberalism have penetrated so 
deeply into state organisations that remaking public services will require much 
more than just a change of ownership; it will also require a deliberate effort to 
remake and rethink how we evaluate performance. 
The vast majority of performance indicators used in the water sector around 
the world are driven by notions of financial efficiency, used in turn to com-
pare water operators with one other. Benchmarking – as these inter-utility 
comparisons are called – has become ubiquitous, ushering in an increasingly 
homogenised form of performance evaluation, often foisted upon water op-
erators regardless of their social, political or economic contexts.
This is not to say that we should never compare water systems or measure 
operator performance. Far from it. Water operators can learn from each other, 
and water users should be supplied with information that allows them to 
demand better outcomes locally, knowing what is possible elsewhere. 
The problem with current benchmarking systems is their narrow empha-
sis on financial performance evaluation, the highly centralised nature of 
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decision-making, and the lack of indicators that look specifically at the ‘public’ 
nature of a water operator.
If remunicipalisation is going to be effective it will require new ways of think-
ing about success and how this is measured and evaluated. Herein lies what 
may prove to be the most difficult part of the remunicipalisation process. 
Although there is no singular way to measure public sector water performance, 
any alternative to the current benchmarking systems must begin with a critical 
review of the institutions and ideologies that inform them.
The aims of this chapter are to briefly review the history of benchmarking 
systems, highlight their main problems, and hint at possible alternatives for 
the future.
Current benchmarking systems
Performance benchmarking in the water sector is a relatively new, but well-
established practice.1 The International Benchmarking Network for Water and 
Sanitation Utilities was the first major international initiative – established by 
the World Bank in 1996 – followed by the formation of two benchmarking 
task groups within the International Water Association (IWA) in the late 
1990s.2 The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) published 
its framework on drinking water and wastewater services in 2007, with more 
than 260 performance indicators. 
There are now dozens of national water benchmarking associations and a 
growing number of regional groups. European water operators have been par-
ticularly active in this regard (e.g. the European Benchmarking Cooperation 
and Aquabench), but there are few national – and virtually no regional – 
benchmarking associations dedicated to water services in Africa, Asia or Latin 
America.3 Performance evaluation does exist in these regions, but assessment 
methods are largely imported (some would say imposed) by international 
financial institutions and funders such as the World Bank and the United 
States Agency for International Development.4
Despite this diversity there is broad consensus within the benchmarking com-
munity as to why performance should be compared: it is seen to enhance 
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transparency and accountability among water operators; to create oppor-
tunities for public participation in decision-making; and to contribute to 
“consensus-based global solutions” for water service provision. 
There is also broad agreement as to what gets measured. Although every 
benchmarking system has its own unique characteristics, most draw heavily 
(if not entirely) on the more than 260 metrics established by ISO and IWA. 
The European Benchmarking Cooperation system, for example, is “fully 
aligned” with IWA protocol and indicators, which are used as “repositories” 
of performance criteria “for reasons of standardisation.”5
Although too lengthy to list in their entirely here, the kinds of criteria used 
include such measures as: number of water and sanitation workers per 1,000 
connections; length of transmission and distribution mains renovated; per-
centages of unaccounted-for water; number of complaints due to water supply 
interruptions; volume of electricity consumed; per capita consumption of 
water; number of mains failures; average time to complete repairs; and price 
variations for different types of consumers. 
Collecting this data is another matter. With so much information to gather 
benchmarking can overwhelm managers and frontline staff. Even the best 
trained and resourced water operators in the world complain about how taxing 
it is. 
But even more challenging is the question of how to analyse and compare this 
data once it is gathered. There are highly technical debates about statistical 
methodologies, making the full benchmarking process almost impossible for 
some municipalities, and with outcomes that are largely impenetrable to the 
average citizen even if it is completed.6 Continued outsourcing of some water 
services can make it hard to track costs, while different ages of infrastructure 
(and uncertainty about their condition) greatly affect statistical evaluations. In 
other words, there may be considerable agreement on what kind of performance 
data to collect and why, but there are substantial differences in terms of how it 
is assessed, leading to diverse outcomes and interpretations across jurisdictions. 
Another concern is that performance measurement can oversimplify complex 
problems.7 For example, metrics looking at the maintenance and replacement 
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of infrastructure can focus on technical or managerial questions while ig-
noring deeper political or governance questions, such as equitable coverage 
and environmental sustainability. Internal decisions can be skewed by this 
misplaced focus on quantitative outputs at the expense of qualitative outcomes, 
with benchmarking becoming an end, rather than a means, to improved 
water services.
Criticisms of benchmarking
For proponents of benchmarking, none of these challenges are deemed fatal 
to the measurement enterprise, and they have not altered the underlying prin-
ciples of, or enthusiasm for, performance evaluations and the criteria they use.
There are more radical critiques of the process, however. One of these con-
cerns is that benchmarking practices are anti-democratic, conducted by 
‘experts’ with little effort to include citizens or workers in the evaluation 
process. Instead of enhancing transparency, benchmarking systems tend to 
be conducted behind closed doors and can be manipulated by managers and 
policy-makers that want to “produce truth” in ways that may be completely 
disconnected from realities on the ground, possibly reinforcing unequal forms 
of service delivery, and serving to shape the way people perceive water plan-
ning and investments.8 In this regard, benchmarking becomes a gatekeeping 
tool for constructing ‘common sense’ from the top-down, often celebrating 
market-based concepts of success and progress while marginalising alternative 
forms of water governance and valuation.9
A second critique is that benchmarking is used to promote commercialisa-
tion in the water sector, by giving competitive advantage to private operators 
in rule-setting. Critics argue that benchmarking organisations are stacked 
with large multinational corporations acting in their own interests, shaping 
‘international standards’ across a wide swath of topics, from environmental 
sustainability to corporate governance.10 The ISO has come under particular 
fire, with critics arguing that most of its committee work is conducted in a 
handful of countries in the North and dominated by large multinationals, 
making it little more than a “corporate private regime.”11
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On a related note, current benchmarking systems are also criticised for en-
couraging – even requiring – commercial behaviour by water operators. When 
used as a way to simulate market pressures, water benchmarking “strongly 
motivates operators to be efficient and innovative, mitigating their operating 
costs and expenses” and easing the way for market-oriented water managers 
to succeed.12 Benchmarking can even prepare the ground for outright priva-
tisation, forcing public water operators to make their financial performance 
accessible for corporate review, in an effort to “pinpoint those [utilities] with 
revenue-generating potential”13 and to “identify viable markets”14 for private 
takeover. 
A third fundamental criticism of current benchmarking systems is that its 
universal performance criteria homogenise water and the people that use it, 
ignoring cultural and political differences and imposing Eurocentric standards 
on the rest of the world. By contrast, critics argue that there are no constant, 
universal truths: “the common good can never be specified a priori (…) as 
a static measure for the quality of governance,”15 implying that universal 
standards for performance measurement are practically and philosophically 
impossible – a radical critique indeed. At the very least, these concerns suggest 
that we must “remain vigilant about the temptation to unequivocally use 
‘science’ and the objectification it entails in dealing with water’s complexity.”16 
An alternative measurement system?
Where does this leave us with regards to performance evaluation of remunici-
palised water utilities? Should benchmarking be rejected outright as a top-
down, commercial and homogenising force? At one level, yes. Mainstream 
benchmarking systems are so deeply embedded in market ideology and so 
inherently technocratic as to make them difficult to reconcile with the aims 
of public, transparent and equitable water services.
But I am equally convinced that we cannot abandon efforts to measure the 
success (or failure) of water services entirely. Nor are all benchmarking sys-
tems – or the people that run them – inherently neoliberal. Tracking and 
understanding unaccounted-for water can take on many different aims and 
characteristics, for example. 
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And without some commonly agreed upon performance criteria how are we 
to establish global demands for improved water access, affordability or worker 
health and safety? How can we share common experiences of ‘good’ (versus 
‘best’) practice and use these to improve equity in water services elsewhere? 
And most concerning of all, if we abandon benchmarking altogether, are we 
simply leaving this powerful tool in the hands of those who (intentionally or 
otherwise) can use performance indicators to commercialise water services or 
overlook inequalities?
My proposal is thus an urgent but modest one: to work towards building al-
ternative methods of performance evaluation and to create counter narratives 
of progressive reforms. An alternative model would offer some standardised 
measurement principles and criteria – without which it would be impossible 
to have a meaningful dialogue across jurisdictions – but be much suppler than 
current benchmarking systems in their encouragement of local interpretations 
and prioritisations that are not captive to the logic of the market. 
I would also advocate for an alternative model that retains some existing 
mainstream performance indicators, such as measurements of water quality, 
response times for repairs, and the numbers of employees per 1,000 connec-
tions. Not only are such indicators important in their own right, they offer 
a strategic entry point for the introduction of new and modified systems of 
measurement that ask deeper questions about water quality across income 
groups, about the impact of the inability to pay on unaccounted-for water 
levels or the gendered composition of the workforce to name but a few of the 
types of equity-oriented metrics that could be employed.
These alternative indicators build on work that has already begun in practice, 
such as the ‘performance principles’ used by more than two dozen public water 
operators in Brazil, including universality, equity, social participation and 
access.17 The Municipal Services Project has expanded on these indicators in 
the form of ‘normative criteria’ for performance, which have been applied to 
the study of a wide range of public services around the world.18 Qualitative 
factors such as public ethos and public sector solidarity have also been added.
These alternative frameworks remain fairly abstract, however, serving as high-
level reference points for comparative research on public services, as opposed 
to sector-specific indicators with clear quantitative measurements. In this 
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regard, much work remains to be done in translating these broad principles 
into concrete day-to-day variables of analysis that can empirically foreground 
questions of equity and public access.
It may also be wise to consider a much reduced number of indicators than 
current benchmarking systems employ. As noted above, the more than 260 
measurements that make up mainstream benchmarking systems are difficult (if 
not impossible) for many water operators to manage, and impenetrable in their 
scope and analysis for the average citizen. The challenge is to find a balance be-
tween the complex reality of water systems and the need for simplification that 
“helps focus people’s minds.”19 It may also be useful to look at ways of represent-
ing benchmarking in visual formats, such as the ‘spider diagrams’ employed by 
City Blueprints for Water used to simplify and pictorialise its benchmarking 
system,20 though other visual representations could also be effective.
None of this will be easy. Decisions on the total number of performance 
indicators and how to compare and prioritise these metrics will be challenging. 
It will also be difficult to attract managers and policy-makers to an alternative 
benchmarking model if they do not see (or want to see) the problems of cur-
rent systems, not to mention the time and resources that will be required to 
make the analytical and organisational shift.
And yet, the timing could not be better. With more than 180 water services 
having been remunicipalised over the past 15 years, and with dozens (if not 
hundreds) looking at the possibility of remunicipalisation in the next de-
cade,21 the political will to think about what it means to be ‘public’ is as strong 
as ever. These newly remunicipalised entities are well placed to see the need for 
changes to the way we do performance evaluation, and they have the opera-
tional mandate to try and make it happen. This trend provides an exceptional 
opportunity to collectively build an alternative measurement future.
Congratulations are still in order, but the longer term struggle has really just 
begun.
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Trade agreements and  
investor protection:  
A global threat to public water
Satoko Kishimoto
Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) cases are emerging as a major threat 
to public water, especially in remunicipalisation cases where municipalities 
want to take back water into public hands after failed privatisation. ISDS is 
included in numerous bilateral investment treaties and is being used by water 
multinationals to claim exorbitant amounts of public money in compensation 
for cancelled service management contracts. The sole threat of an ISDS case in 
opaque and industry-biased international tribunals can be enough to convince 
a local government to stick with private water despite poor performance. 
With new trade and investment treaties such as the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) ex-
pected to promote ISDS further, the balance of power will tip even more in 
favour of private firms and leave public authorities with limited policy control 
over essential services. No less worrying is the international Trade in Services 
Agreement (TiSA) that could make the liberalisation and privatisation of 
water irreversible. 
Remunicipalisation: A global trend
Remunicipalisation in the water sector and for other social services is a sig-
nificant trend because it demonstrates that past decisions to privatise are 
reversible. By March 2015, more than 235 cities and communities in 37 
countries had taken back control of their water services over the last 15 years.1 
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And this number is growing. Reasons to remunicipalise water services are 
similar worldwide: deterioration of services, under-investment, disputes 
over operational costs and price increases, soaring water bills, difficulties in 
monitoring private operators, and lack of financial transparency. Generally, 
municipalities decide to revert to public management when they find private 
contracts to be socially and financially unsustainable. How best to provide 
essential services is a critical matter for citizens, and elected officials have to 
make a responsive choice based on citizens’ needs. Almost all cases of remu-
nicipalisation happened when it was (newly) elected local councils that took 
the bold decision to reverse privatisation. In some cases, residents exercised 
direct democracy to be heard by their local governments, for example through 
a referendum.4 When service providers do not meet expectations, policy-
makers can reverse a service contract based on pragmatic considerations to 
best respond to citizens’ needs in a cost-effective way. The ability to respond 
to new information on service performance or shifting public opinion is an 
essential part of democracy.
Box 1 What is investor-state dispute settlement?
ISDS gives foreign investors the ability to directly sue countries in private 
international tribunals for compensation over health, environmental, fi-
nancial and other domestic policies that allegedly undermine their corpo-
rate rights. Arbitration mechanisms generally designate the World Bank’s 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or 
other tribunals such as at the International Chamber of Commerce as adju-
dicators. Investor-state lawsuits are decided by private arbitrators selected by 
the conflicting parties, not by independent judges. There is a demonstrated 
arbitrator bias in favour of investors: 42% of cases2 have been decided in 
favour of the state compared to 31% for investors. Another 27% of cases 
were settled without ruling (often resulting in major payments by govern-
ments).3 This extended investor protection mechanism is found in over 
3,000 existing international and bilateral investment treaties worldwide. 
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This chapter examines remunicipalisation cases in which national and local 
governments were sued by water multinationals using traditional litigation 
strategies in national courts and the increasingly common investor protection 
clauses from bilateral investment treaties (BITs), and how this has affected 
their policy options. The chapter also explains why trade and investment 
agreements such as the TTIP, TPP and TiSA would undermine the remu-
nicipalisation trend if signed. 
Companies are well protected against remunicipalisation
In the last 15 years, many of the municipalities that have terminated private 
contracts around the world have experienced harsh financial consequences. 
Termination fees or compensations paid to private water companies are com-
monplace. Multinationals are generally well protected by national commercial 
law in the event of contract termination to be compensated for profits that 
were expected until the end of the contract period. The water privatisation 
contract in Jakarta (analysed in this book), for example, defines that in the 
event of any type of termination either by the municipality or the private 
company, even if due to bankruptcy, the municipality will have to pay a con-
siderable compensation to the private company. 
Another stark example is Castres, a city in Southern France that terminated the 
contract with Suez in 2004 after a seven-year battle initiated by a small group 
of committed citizens. In 1997, citizens filed a court case and the regional 
Toulouse Administrative Court ruled that the price of water was too high; 
moreover, the contract itself was deemed illegal as the former mayor had signed 
it without consulting the town council, as legally required. Nevertheless, the 
company, stung by the unilateral termination that followed, went to the court 
again in 2003 to ask for the reimbursement of investments (€66 million) and 
damages (€58.8 million). The court ruled that the city had to pay €30 million 
to Suez to compensate for investments.5 
We observe how private water companies have the higher hand in similar liti-
gations elsewhere. Set compensation for investments made tend to overlook 
Trade agreements and investor protection: A global threat to public water
99
past profit gains from the private contract. Commercial law also disregards the 
quality of public service delivery when examining such contracts. 
Yet serious violations of service provision standards by private companies are 
often at the centre of the motivation for remunicipalisation. Many cases, from 
Buenos Aires to Jakarta, show that disputes and conflicts over violations of 
contractual obligations between parties tax public authorities of enormous 
time and resources to prove.6 
Municipalities face even harsher conditions when investor protection regimes 
are strengthened through BITs. In other words, private companies can use this 
additional tool to maximise gains when they lose a contract. 
ISDS as a mounting threat to public water
In the 1990s, Argentina privatised most of its utility services as part of the neo-
liberal government’s agenda. During the same period, Argentina entered 50 
BITs whose investor protection mechanisms would come to play an infamous 
role in future renationalisation cases. In water and sanitation services, 18 con-
cession contracts were signed. Among them, nine were terminated between 
1997 and 2008.7 Tariffs, service performance and investment became core 
issues and sources of conflict between companies and the responsible public 
authorities in all cases. Six cases were brought before the ICSID. Argentina is 
the country that has been most sued under international investment treaties in 
the world (on 55 known cases). To put this case in context, two-thirds of those 
cases have to do with recovery measures taken by Argentina following the 
2001-2002 national economic crisis. The government passed an Emergency 
Law in 2002 abandoning dollar-peso parity of exchange and devaluated the 
currency, in order to help the crisis-hit economy to recover. Argentina also 
defaulted on its debt and froze the public services tariffs to keep them afford-
able for residents. 
For example, France’s SAUR International filed against Argentina in 2004 
concerning a water and sewerage concession in the Mendoza province, 
claiming they had been expropriated without compensation. SAUR invoked 
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a violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard under the Argentina-
France bilateral investment treaty. The ICSID tribunal found Argentina liable 
for claims by SAUR in June 2012.8 
As another example, the province of Buenos Aires made a concession contract 
with Azurix, a subsidiary of US-based Enron in 1999 for 30 years and quickly 
faced opposition over tariff increase, water quality and delays in infrastructure 
investment. During the ensuing negotiation process, Azurix terminated the 
concession contract without complying with commitments made due to the 
bankruptcy of its parent company Enron. Azurix still filed a complaint with 
ICSID against the Argentine government and the province of Buenos Aires, 
claiming public authorities purposely delayed the permission to increase the 
water tariff and breached the Argentina-US treaty. ICSID ruled in 2006 that 
the Argentine government should pay US$165 million with interest to Azurix 
and cover the ICSID expenses.9  
During that time, Santa Fe province terminated the contract with Aguas 
Provinciales de Santa Fe whose majority shareholders were Suez (France) 
and Agbar (Spain) due to dissatisfaction with services and a strong public 
campaign in 2005. Prior to this, Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe filed a case 
at ICSID and demanded US$243.8 million from the Argentine state, blam-
ing the public authority for its failure to increase tariffs after the country’s 
abolition of the dollar-peso parity in 2002, which changed trading condi-
tions. The company said the government’s action destabilised the conces-
sion, and amounted to expropriation, breaching the clause on fair and 
equitable treatment under the Argentina-France and the Argentina-Spain 
BITs. ICSID accepted this jurisdiction in 2006.10 Aguas Argentinas SA, 
the Suez-led water company that operated in the city of Buenos Aires made 
almost identical claims11 at ICSID prior to the government terminating 
the contract in 2006.
The use of ISDS in BITs to demand compensation has increased in the last 
few years. Mexico, for instance, received notice of four investor disputes 
during 2013.12 One of them was from French water treatment company 
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Degrémont, which notified Mexico of a potential ISDS claim at ICSID 
under the France-Mexico BIT. The dispute concerns investment in local 
company Tapsa, which operated four water treatment plants from 1999 in 
the city of Puebla until the contract with the municipal government was 
terminated in 2012 on the grounds that water quality had fallen below of-
ficial standards. Degrémont says the termination and subsequent occupation 
of the plants by state officials amounted to an indirect expropriation and 
exercise of arbitrary power. The compensation requested by Degrémont is 
still unknown. 
In fact, a state can be sued over mere disagreements on tariff increases, before 
remunicipalisation is even considered. Estonian company Tallinna Vesi and 
its owner United Utilities Tallinn brought a claim against the national gov-
ernment under a BIT in October 2014. United Utilities is a UK company 
registered in the Netherlands, which enables Tallinna Vesi and United Utilities 
Tallinn to use the Estonia-Netherlands BIT. The company alleges that Estonia 
breached the fair and equitable treatment standard of the BIT in refusing 
Tallinna Vesi’s application for tariff increases on the basis of a new law passed 
in 2010. The law gives the Estonian competition authority power to cap 
utility companies’ profits at what it determines to be “reasonable” levels. The 
companies are seeking damages over €90 million to cover their projected total 
losses over the lifetime of the contract up until 2020.13
Chilling effect on policy
The threat of a lawsuit often prevents governments from passing laws or adopt-
ing new policies in the public interest. The case of Bulgarian capital Sofia 
is a good example. Residents of Sofia have suffered from illegal water price 
increases and scant investment since the city signed a privatisation contract 
in 2000 with Sofiyska Voda, whose major shareholder is Veolia. Additional 
clauses were secretly added in 2008 and one of these clauses enables the com-
pany to take Bulgaria to the Vienna International Arbitral Centre. In 2011, the 
city disconnected 1,000 households from water supply and prosecuted 5,000 
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more for non-payment of water bills upon a request from the privatized utility. 
While these actions were violating the human right to water, the municipality 
said its hands were tied by the private concessionaire’s threat to sue authorities 
for unpaid bills. Citizens and some elected officials had collected enough 
signatures to hold a referendum on remunicipalisation of water services but 
the city did not allow such a plebiscite since the private company was also ready 
to file a lawsuit should it take place.14 
This kind of chilling effect is observed in many places. Montbéliard in France 
decided in 2010 to remunicipalise the water system managed by Veolia since 
1992. The decision was confirmed by an official vote of the council in 2013 
and was expected to take effect in 2015 (seven years before the end of the 
concession contract). But Veolia challenged this decision before a national 
court and asked for litigation to obtain €95 million in compensation for 
breach of contract.15 In 2014 the city gave in to the threat and reversed its 
decision to remunicipalise. 
These cases show that private companies effectively exercise their power and 
end up distorting public policies. Across the globe, there is mounting evi-
dence that investors successfully reverse new policies and regulations drafted 
to protect public health and the environment. If the threat of traditional 
litigation was already an effective deterrent, it is even more so with ISDS 
disputes because they raise the costs of such a political decision even further 
and tend to lead to even more unaffordable compensations.16 It is not difficult 
to imagine that water multinationals will use this powerful tool against states 
and municipalities in the event of remunicipalisation. 
Remunicipalisation is not easy. It requires overcoming a range of technical 
hurdles in addition to the legal ones discussed above. Public authorities often 
have to either buy back shares or disburse significant compensation costs.17 
The current global investment framework marked by the rise of ISDS certainly 
makes remunicipalisation harder. The choice of how to provide essential ser-
vices such as water should be based on democratic decisions and should not 
be guided by foreign investors’ interests. 
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Box 1 TTIP
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is a proposed 
trade and investment agreement that has been under negotiation between 
the United States and the European Union since the summer of 2013. 
The negotiators on both sides want to include ISDS. The process is widely 
criticised, in large part because of its secrecy, the agreement’s expansive 
scope, and some controversial clauses including ISDS. According to the 
European Commission, there will be sectoral exceptions for public services 
(public education, health and social services, and water).18 Whether this 
will indeed be the case remains to be seen. Moreover, exempting the water 
sector from trade liberalisation under the TTIP is not an effective guarantee 
against investor-state cases by water multinationals: If investor protection 
and ISDS are included in the agreement, the corporations can make use 
of this to ‘protect their investments’ even in the water sector, effectively 
circumventing the exemption. In those countries where the water sector 
is already partly liberalised, the TTIP would create a serious obstacle for 
remunicipalisation. 
Box 3 TPP
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is another proposed regulatory and in-
vestment treaty. As of 2014, 12 countries throughout the Asia-Pacific region 
had participated in negotiations: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, 
Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United 
States and Vietnam. While the text under negotiation is secret, it is known 
to include cross-border services, government procurement and investment, 
among others. The TPP’s starting point on government procurement for 
instance seems to be based on a similar agreement under the World Trade 
Organisation, which excludes water services. However, there is a tendency 
to expand and deepen liberalisation’s scope and it is still unknown how 
water services are treated under the TPP. 
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New trade and investment treaties 
Including investor protection clauses in the TTIP, TPP or Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) would extend the use of ISDS glob-
ally. Regarding remunicipalisation and renationalisation, as foreign investors 
private operators can claim a violation of investor protection on the grounds 
of expropriation and exercise of arbitrary state power (e.g. Degrémont vs 
Mexico, Azurix vs Argentina) or following devaluation of local currency (e.g. 
Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe vs Argentina). Civil society campaigners fight-
ing excessive investor protection and investor rights see the concept of “fair 
and equitable treatment” as potentially the most dangerous for taxpayers and 
regulators. This principle is the one most used in investors’ successful claims. 
Protecting investors’ “legitimate expectations,” it creates the “right” to a stable 
regulatory environment for investors, preventing governments from altering 
laws or regulations, even in light of new conditions or democratic processes.19 
Public protests are rapidly building up on the trade and investment treaties 
under negotiation because they would strengthen massively such investor 
protection and cover large parts of the world. 
TiSA and public services 
Although TiSA has gotten less attention so far compared with the TTIP, TPP 
and CETA, it may have the biggest potential impact on public services and 
may effectively restrict the policy space of municipalities. One could question 
why TiSA is needed as the comprehensive General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATT) already exists under the World Trade Organisation. TiSA is 
an attempt to go further and speed up the process among like-minded states 
that are committed to extending service liberalisation outside of the WTO. 
The transnational private services industry pushes this agenda openly and 
aggressively.  
How would TiSA affect public services? In theory, the GATT and TiSA both 
exclude services “provided in the exercise of governmental authority” from 
their scope. However, TiSA defines public services extremely narrowly as “any 
service which is supplied neither on a commercial basis nor in competition 
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with one or more service suppliers.” In practice, public services such as health 
care, social services, education, waste, water and postal service systems are 
delivered to the population through a more complex and mixed system than 
that, being funded in whole or in part by governments and regulated more 
or less tightly. So in fact this narrow definition leaves little or no effective 
protection for public services.20
What is even more striking about TiSA is that it could effectively deprive local 
authorities of key public service policy space. Its “standstill” clause would 
lock in current levels of service liberalisation permanently, by banning any 
moves from market to public provision of services unless there exist explicit 
exemptions. That is, once a city or state liberalises and/or introduces a public-
private mix to service delivery, the level of liberalisation is fixed and a (future) 
government cannot go back on this decision. 
Take the example of the National Health Service (NHS) in the UK, which is 
publicly run. The government’s Health and Social Care Act of 2012 opened 
the door for private service providers. Since this act came into force, 70 per 
cent of health services put out to tender have gone to the private sector.21 
Saving the NHS from further privatisation has been the focus of the growing 
protest against the TiSA (and the TTIP) in the UK. Indeed, if the UK govern-
ment wanted to change health policy and regulation after signing on to the 
agreement to bring the NHS fully back into public hands, TiSA’s standstill 
clause would likely prevent it. 
In the UK, water, railway and energy services were privatised in the 1980s and 
1990s. After decades of private management, public opinion polls have shown 
that the majority of people want public ownership of these services (71 per 
cent for water, 68 per cent for energy, 66 per cent for railway).22 TiSA’s stand-
still provision would be enough for private investors to claim the impossibility 
to reverse privatisation and they would not even need to bring the government 
before an international arbitration court to settle the matter (while they could 
certainly do so to obtain lucrative compensation). The standstill provision 
precludes remunicipalisation and renationalisation unless sectors have been 
explicitly excluded in the agreement. 
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Box 4 TiSA
The Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) negotiations were launched in late 
2012 with the aim to liberalise global trade in services and to improve rules 
in the areas of licensing, financial services, telecoms, e-commerce, maritime 
transport and professionals moving abroad temporarily to provide services. 
The EU and the US are the main proponents of the agreement. The original 
16 members of the TiSA have expanded their ranks to include 23 parties. 
Since the EU represents 28 member states, there are 50 countries repre-
sented. Criticism about the secrecy of the agreement arose after WikiLeaks 
released part of the negotiated document in June 2014. Public Services 
International (PSI), a global trade union federation, warns that TiSA makes 
it easier for multinationals to take over vital public services, such as health 
care and education. PSI warns that TiSA will also restrict governments’ 
rights to regulate stronger standards in the public interest. ISDS does not 
appear to have been included in the negotiation so far but this treaty could 
have devastating impacts on the prospects for remunicipalisation. 
Trading away democracy
The TTIP, TPP, CETA and TiSA are increasingly being challenged in Europe 
and elsewhere. In October 2014, over 400 actions were organized in 20 
European countries to reject the secret trade deals that the EU is negotiating.23 
A European Citizens’ Initiative had collected one million signatures in just 
two months by December 2014 to call on the EU to stop negotiations on the 
TTIP and not to ratify CETA.24 Critics are particularly concerned about ISDS 
provisions in CETA and their probable inclusion in the TTIP. 
The European Commission held a public consultation on ISDS in the summer 
of 2014. Nearly 150,000 people contributed from a wide range of institutions 
– the highest number of responses ever for an EU consultation – showing the 
strength of public opinion on the matter. This included the European associa-
tion of public water operators Aqua Publica Europea, which considers “that 
recourse to ISDS will not improve in any way the investment flow between 
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the US and EU, may create discriminatory conditions for domestic companies 
and, above all, can lead to a limitation of states’ right to decide how to organize 
the provision of public services.”25 The European Commission nevertheless 
made clear that it would not drop the controversial ISDS provisions from the 
TTIP negotiation. 
There is growing concern by parliamentarians and local authorities with the 
secrecy of negotiations. The three umbrella organisations of German munici-
palities jointly denounced the risks posed to public services by the CETA, 
TTIP and TiSA.26 They argue that public services should be taken out of these 
agreements and remunicipalisation of public services should not be impeded. 
Herta Däubler-Gmelin, professor of law and former Minister of Justice in 
Germany, sharply pointed to the lack of legitimacy of these negotiations and 
the threat they represent to the principles of democracy27 as they will require 
changes in laws at the national level. 
At least CETA now excludes certain services such as drinking water due to 
strong public pressure. If drinking water services were to be included in TiSA, 
the effect would be even greater than what was feared in the case of CETA. 
Box 5 CETA
The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) is a free trade 
agreement between Canada and the EU. It includes an ISDS mechanism. 
On September 2014, Canada and the EU announced the conclusion of the 
negotiation process. The agreement must still be approved by the European 
Council and the Parliament, and ratified in Canada. If approved, the agree-
ment will come into effect in 2016. As regards water services, after con-
siderable pressure from the public to exclude them from the agreement, 
Canada and the EU have included broad reservations on ‘market access and 
national treatment’ obligations with respect to the collection, purification 
and distribution of water. These reservations give governments the authority 
to restore public monopolies where water privatisation has failed, but foreign 
investors can still challenge this decision under the fair and equitable treat-
ment principle and the expropriation provisions of the investment chapter.28
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Conclusion 
Remunicipalisation is a response of municipalities and citizens to devast-
ing privatisations and is a clear expression of the desire to take services back 
into public hands. Remunicipalisation is a remedy for municipalities when 
a private company fails to meet its contractual obligations and when a pri-
vate contract becomes socially and financially unsustainable. This small but 
legitimate window to exercise democracy must not be allowed to close due to 
excessive investor protection through ISDS. 
Satoko Kishimoto is coordinator of the Reclaiming Public Water 
Network and the Water Justice Project at the Transnational 
Institute (TNI). 
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Conclusion
Reclaiming public water  
through remunicipalisation
Satoko Kishimoto, Olivier Petitjean and Emanuele Lobina
Remunicipalisation is an undeniable trend as evidenced by the analysis pre-
sented in this book. Despite more than three decades of relentless promotion 
of privatisation and public-private partnerships (PPPs) by international finan-
cial institutions and national governments, many cities, regions and countries 
have chosen to close the book on private water and to bring services back into 
public control. More than 235 cities from 37 countries have remunicipalised 
water services over the last 15 years. 
Remunicipalisation is generally a collective reaction to the unsustainability of 
water privatisation and PPPs. The pace of this trend has accelerated dramati-
cally. It has been most symbolic in France, the country with the longest history 
of water privatisation, which is also home to the leading water multinationals. 
The experiences in other key countries (US, Germany) and major cities (Paris, 
Jakarta) featured in this book also demonstrate that privatisation and PPPs 
fail to deliver on the promised benefits to local governments and citizens and 
that public management is better suited to meet the long-term needs of end 
users, local authorities and society at large – including the need to protect our 
local and global environment.
In most countries, the expansion of modern water and sanitation systems hap-
pened as a result of public ownership and investment in response to increasing 
demand and public health concerns in urban areas. In the 1990s, however, 
many countries privatised their water and sanitation services as a result of 
strong international pressure to open up the services sector. Thus a similar 
public effort is required today to address our pressing water challenges, such as 
urbanisation and access to water and sanitation in the South, climate change 
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and water conservation. The global experience with remunicipalisation shows 
yet again, that a collaborative and democratic public sector is in a better posi-
tion to lead the way into a sustainable water future. 
By way of conclusion, we offer an overview of the key lessons from the cases 
presented in this book and also draw from our global list of remunicipalisation 
to illustrate additional cross-cutting themes such as the challenge posed to 
public water services by investor protection clauses, the position of the trade 
union movement vis-à-vis remunicipalisation as a social project, and perfor-
mance evaluation as a way of measuring the success of remunicipalisation. 
Stop irresponsible policy prescriptions
Despite the failures of the flagship privatisations of the 1990s, including in 
Buenos Aires and Jakarta, international financial institutions continue to 
promote water privatisation as a solution to provide access to safe water in 
the South.
A more recent example is that of Lagos, Nigeria, the largest city in Africa 
with 21 million people. Only 5 per cent of residents have household water 
connections and sanitation is non-existent across much of the metropolis, 
while hospitals are full of people suffering from diarrhea and other water-
borne diseases. Because of the lack of access to water, people have either il-
legally connected to the public water network of the Lagos Water Corporation 
(LWC) or rely on buying low quality water from private vendors. Lagos’s 
reality mirrors the challenges in many other places in the world where access 
to clean and affordable water is an ongoing struggle. It is clear that investments 
and institutional reform are needed. In 2014, the World Bank’s International 
Finance Corporation recommended private sector participation in LWC. The 
public utility rejected this policy advice, leading the bank to withdraw its 
loan commitment.1 International and regional development banks have to 
stop imposing such irresponsible policy conditions and abusing the power of 
money. The Nigerian government and the public water utility LWC have to 
create space for democratic discussions on how they want to improve services. 
The international community should respect and support this process. 
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Today, the same flawed model of water privatisation and private sector invest-
ment prescribed in the South is being promoted in the European Union in 
the context of the financial and economic crisis, as a way to improve public 
finances and to fund cash-strapped water services. This has been the case 
in Greece where the attempt to privatise the water operators of Athens and 
Thessaloniki failed in the face of public resistance and concurring court deci-
sions2; other countries such as Portugal, Ireland, Spain or Italy have experi-
enced similar attempts. The Portuguese Court of Auditors recently uncovered 
the asymmetry that is intrinsic in PPP contracts between municipalities and 
private companies, which makes it difficult for municipalities to monitor 
the quality of investments and to assess financial implications.3 Indeed, past 
experience shows that such policies turn out to be worse for public budgets in 
the long term, and lead to poor services and a loss of democratic transparency. 
There is too much counter-evidence to believe naively what the private water 
sector promises to deliver. The growing list of remunicipalisation from around 
the world demonstrates that privatisation and PPPs are socially and financially 
unsustainable; it also shows how hard local authorities and citizens have to 
work to take back their services. There is growing awareness and evidence that 
service management by the private sector is very expensive. 
Reject privatisation and PPPs, there are  
other solutions 
Because of popular discontent with water privatisation, private water com-
panies have used their marketing propaganda to encourage people to believe 
that PPPs are distinct from privatisation; they are not. PPP means the transfer 
of services management control to the private sector. PPP promotion within 
governments remains aggressive today and its proponents have managed to 
present it as a solution to bring ‘innovative financing’ to the water sector.
Local authorities and policy-makers should be extremely careful when con-
sidering privatisation and PPPs in water services. Reversing private contracts 
is possible but is not easy at all; it involves major costs, time and expertise. It is 
advisable to avoid privatisation and PPPs in the first place and seek assistance 
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from and partnerships with other local authorities and public operators instead 
because they share common missions and values. Inter-municipal cooperation 
can generate economies of scale and such public-public partnerships (PuPs) 
can strengthen operators’ capacity to solve problems. It is encouraging to learn 
that national and regional public water operators’ associations are starting to 
play an active role in sharing knowledge and providing peer-to-peer support. 
Their basic values of cooperation and solidarity (instead of competition) can 
go a long way to improving services and enhancing (rather than undermin-
ing) local capacity. At the international level, the Global Water Operators’ 
Partnerships Alliance (GWOPA) was established to foster not-for-profit, 
peer-to-peer knowledge sharing to strengthen local capacity. GWOPA is one 
among many initiatives to pool knowledge and commitments to support 
utilities that wish to enhance their capacity to provide better services.
Remunicipalisation is a viable remedy
If water services are already privatised in your town, remunicipalisation is 
a possible and viable remedy to end financially and socially unsustainable 
contracts. Again, remunicipalisation is not easy and even if negotiations go 
smoothly with a private contractor there are a series of steps that should not be 
neglected: technical issues such as the transfer of accounting and information 
systems, worker transition, institutional knowledge recovery and the need to 
build a new culture among managers, engineers, technicians, etc. Fortunately 
local authorities and citizens can learn precious lessons from the more than 
235 cities in the North and South that have successfully remunicipalised 
their water services. There is strong evidence that remunicipalisation brought 
them operational effectiveness, increased investment in water systems and 
higher levels of transparency. Moreover, remunicipalisation offers a chance to 
reinvent public water services and make them more effective and accountable 
to the local community. It offers an opportunity to build socially desirable 
and environmentally sustainable public water models for the benefit of present 
and future generations.
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Building alliances 
The experience of the remunicipalisation movement, as analysed in this book, 
shows the value of building broader alliances and collaboration between pub-
lic operators, local officials, workers and citizens, not only to remunicipalise 
but also to improve public management afterwards. All of the authors in this 
book have been involved in one way or another in remunicipalisation move-
ments for years. As such, they share their hands-on experience with a view to 
supporting cities and communities that are seeking to remunicipalise water 
services or want to create safeguards against privatisation. 
France, Germany, US and Jakarta 
The majority of the population in Germany and in the United States enjoys 
public water provision while France is one of the few countries in the world 
where the majority is served by private water operators instead. Having had 
the longest and deepest experiences in private water management, France is 
now the seismic centre of remunicipalisation. Anne Le Strat, former President 
of Eau de Paris and deputy mayor of Paris, and Christophe Lime, President 
of France Eau Publique affirm that the political landscape has changed with 
major cities such as Paris, Grenoble, Nice, Montpellier and Rennes4 return-
ing to public management. Such is the remunicipalisation wave that private 
operators today need to lobby hard to convince cities to renew the private con-
tracts that were once so easy for them to obtain, according to Le Strat. In Nice, 
even if the majority of the council and the mayor are considered conservative, 
they have decided not to renew the private water contract in 2013, showing 
that this issue goes beyond ideological choice. Because of mounting criticism 
on private management, stricter regulations were introduced in the 1990s in 
France to increase competition and transparency but Lime argues that this 
only translated into cost-cutting within private utilities and worsening service 
quality for users while financial transparency remained limited. 
Mary Grant, a researcher with Food & Water Watch explains that the popula-
tion served by local governments grew by 7 per cent between 2007 and 2013 
in the US. This pace is comparable with France where the population served 
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by public providers has been increasing by 1 per cent annually since 2008 
according to Lime. The movement to retain and strengthen public water 
services is vibrant in the US, and it is interesting to see that the country shares 
a common trend with France: many public water systems have expanded their 
services to neighbouring areas using the existing network, and remunicipalised 
water companies have merged with other towns and cities to harmonise water 
quality and services.
The population of Germany is well informed about the pitfalls of privatisation 
too following failed experiments in cities such as Berlin and Stuttgart and no 
longer accepts to sell away water management and assets to the private sector, 
as explained by Christa Hecht, General Manager of the Alliance of Public 
Water Associations (AöW). Her claim is backed by opinion polls showing that 
82 per cent of the population supports public water. Hecht stresses that the 
knowledge and experience of engineers and technical experts from the public 
sector is at least as valuable as that found in private companies. This coincides 
with International Monetary Fund and World Bank analysis from 2004 that 
recognises that there is no significant difference between public and private 
operators in terms of efficiency or other performance measurements.5 Hecht 
concludes that the public water sector is clearly superior when it comes to 
taking social and environmental concerns seriously in the planning of infra-
structure, as well as in setting tariffs. 
Remunicipalisation is not a phenomenon only in developed countries. Jakarta, 
Indonesia is the most recent and significant win in the struggle to end water 
privatisation. Water multinational Suez signed a privatisation contract in 
1997 that would have run until 2022. But Suez failed to fulfill its obligations to 
extend and improve water supply to the city’s inhabitants, overcharging water 
users, forcing public authorities in heavy debt while it was making high private 
profits. Nila Ardhianie and Irfan Zamzami, researchers at the Amrta Institute 
for Water Literacy, have investigated the flaws of privatisation in their city for 
more than 10 years and organised countless public debates to advocate for 
the right to water and public management. The citizen mobilisations gained 
momentum when a coalition of Jakarta residents filed a civil law suit in 2012 
against local authorities and the private companies by claiming the illegality of 
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the original privatisation projects. While such a strategy cost enormous energy 
and resources, it became a critical reference for citizens to consolidate their 
position and contributed to shifting public authorities’ discourse. Without the 
persistent efforts of committed citizen groups, Jakarta’s privatisation would 
go on and private companies would keep profiting. It is unfortunate that 
Jakarta had to bear as long as 16 years of water privatisation and such setbacks 
in achieving universal access to water. It is high time that residents and public 
authorities got this fresh start to build an efficient and democratic public water 
system to serve people’s needs and protect the environment. As exemplified 
by this case, citizen engagement remains a critical factor in building a genuine 
public culture in water services after remunicipalisation.
Reasons to remunicipalise 
The chapters in this book and ongoing research on 235 cases of remunici-
palisation worldwide confirm that the reasons to remunicipalise water ser-
vices are universal. The false promises of water privatisation that have led to 
remunicipalisation include: poor performance, under-investment, disputes 
over operational costs and price increases, soaring water bills, monitoring 
difficulties, lack of financial transparency, workforce cuts and poor service 
quality. In the case of Jakarta notably, all of these factors combine.
Water quality problems are often linked with job cuts and inadequate system 
maintenance by private operators, putting public health at risk and creating 
environmental hazards as happened in the US and elsewhere. Grant explains 
how local governments remunicipalise their water services primarily to secure 
the local control necessary to reduce costs and improve services in the US. 
Water price increases accompanied by worsening quality of water due to the 
lack of investment in network upgrades was experienced in Rennes, France 
where 30 per cent of residents were delivered insufficient quality drinking 
water. Today, in France, private operators claim to have introduced greater 
transparency in their contracts, but in practice, as Lime argues, asymmetry of 
information is intrinsic to service outsourcing, and local authorities only have 
a very limited ability to verify the information provided by private operators. 
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Water tariff increases coupled with non-compliance with investment obliga-
tions were also recorded in Berlin.6 Hecht points out that public authorities 
could neither oversee nor influence private operators in Germany. In the 
South, the tariff increases and connection fees that followed privatisation in 
Bolivia, Argentina, India (Latur) and Mali also made the service unaffordable.7 
Cost savings 
The driving force behind remunicipalisation is the desire to secure local control 
over essential resources and to reduce costs. The most common and obvious 
change is that local authorities can save significant costs when taking water 
service provision back in-house. The survey on 18 small US communities 
found that return to public operation cut costs by an average of 21 per cent 
(see chapter 2, this volume); a big city like Houston (2.7 million people) cut 
costs in 17 per cent, or $2 million annually. This was made possible thanks to 
efficiency gains in public operations, by stopping outsourcing, and reducing 
the cost of monitoring external contractors. The same kinds of savings were 
achieved in Hamilton, Canada (C$1.2 million), in Grenoble (€40 million) 
and Paris (€35 million within the first year of operation), France.8 In many 
cases such public savings allow increasing investments to improve the network 
or reducing the water bill for users (Paris).
Private companies tend to use their own subsidiary companies for outsourc-
ing and overcharge for services. A small town in Spain, Arenys de Munt,9 
found that the previous private concessionaire was charging fees nearly four 
times higher to expand the municipal network than the town later did. Local 
authorities in Germany also realised that they could get more competitive rates 
by contracting local service providers, contributing to the regional economy 
at the same time. 
The experience of Buenos Aires province10 and its 2.5 million inhabitants is 
just as dramatic. The newly established public company ABSA collaborated 
with the workers’ cooperative, 5 de Septiembre S.A., to improve operations 
and successfully reduced 75 per cent of technical costs compared to the pri-
vate management period. Together they were able to restore drinking and 
wastewater plants. In Jakarta, the Amrta Institute estimates that public water 
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company PAM Jaya could potentially decrease operational costs by 29 per 
cent post-remunicipalisation.  
Remunicipalisation carries other inherent advantages associated with public 
management, such as cooperation among municipal departments to ration-
alise operations and share equipment. For example, water and transport de-
partments can work together to time water pipeline replacements with street 
repairs to avoid redundant repaving work. Municipal inter-departmental 
cooperation permits better use of resources. 
Investment 
Operational cost savings can be used towards increasing investments to expand 
access to water and sanitation (in the South) and/or to replace old infrastruc-
ture in order to meet stricter environmental regulation (in the North). This is 
a fundamental difference from private management in which cost savings tend 
to translate into dividends for shareholders. In 2014, France’s Regional Court 
of Auditors published reports to evaluate Eau de Paris and explicitly pointed 
out that the return to public management enabled the city to lower the price 
of water while maintaining a high level of investment (conversation with Le 
Strat, this volume). Argentine cities (Buenos Aires, Santa Fe) also underwent 
ambitious investment programmes to expand services following remunicipali-
sation, with support from the national government, and were able to maintain 
water tariffs at affordable levels. Similarly, national governments made major 
investments in La Paz/El Alto in Bolivia and Dar es Salaam11 in Tanzania after 
remunicipalisation with the aim to expand services to unserved people. These 
cities’ experiences tell us that public commitment is essential to achieve an 
ambitious social goal like universal access to water and adequate sanitation. 
Obstruction and new threat
Almost all cases presented in the book chapters were fraught with a range 
of difficulties. In particular, cities that terminated a private contract before 
expiry often entered into conflict with private contractors, which often 
led to litigation procedures. Private companies are well protected in the 
event of contract termination, both by commercial and national laws. 
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In general, remunicipalisation is smoother when it is the result of non-renewal 
of a contract upon expiry. Municipalities in France tend to wait for contract 
expiry to avoid paying compensation; in the meantime the municipality can 
prepare the new public model. Many municipalities face serious breach of 
contractual obligations and this situation is often the most direct motivation 
for remunicipalisation. However, it is hard for municipalities to prove such 
violations and filing cases before courts requires a lot of time and legal costs. 
Moreover, the book chapter that examines investor-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS) mechanisms found in many bilateral investment treaties shows how 
they are emerging as a major threat for remunicipalisation. ISDS gives power 
to investors to bring states before international arbitration tribunals and this 
tool is increasingly used by companies to maximise compensation. Policy 
space for local authorities that wish to reverse privatisation is shrinking in the 
face of excessive investor protection, which undermines democracy.  
Remunicipalisation can also take place by purchasing shares back from pri-
vate companies. Berlin is a clear example of how the state government had 
to bear high costs to buy back shares (€1.3 billion in total). Similarly, the 
amount that Selangor state in Malaysia disbursed to buy back four private 
concessionaires’ shares added up to €1.9 billion.12 In these cases, local gov-
ernments can avoid legal battles but they impose a heavy financial burden on 
tax payers for decades by taking up loans to buy back assets. Berlin citizens 
had already paid a lot through their water bills for services and assets as 
well as companies’ generous profits during privatisation; they now have to 
repay the debt of local authorities after remunicipalisation. In such cases, 
despite ownership change, public companies may be forced to remain profit-
seeking and little space is left to build a new public service culture and values. 
Expensive share repurchase results in high water bills and may prevent the 
public company from taking on social and environmental challenges. 
Workers in remunicipalisation
Workers are at the frontline of the remunicipalisation challenge to provide 
quality services. The European Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU) 
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sees remunicipalisation as an opportunity for trade unions not only to improve 
working conditions but also to push for greater worker participation in gov-
ernance of the public company to rebuild public service values. Nevertheless, 
workers are seen as costly (salary) and job cuts are frequent with private 
management as well in the context of austerity policies imposed on public 
administrations in most European countries. 
It is essential to recognise that committed and qualified workers are key to 
providing good services. Thus working conditions and worker safety should 
be a high priority in public water management. Workers have played active 
roles in building public water services in the city of Buenos Aires and the 
province. Workers own 10 per cent of shares in the new public companies 
and training for workers has increased dramatically. A creative strategy was 
also developed with the workers’ cooperative in Buenos Aires province, 5 de 
Septiembre, which is not only responsible for technical operations and quality, 
but also for outreach with neighbourhood associations and communities. 
For their part, the worker cooperatives of public utility AySA (city of Buenos 
Aires) have worked with residents in expanding water access in low-income 
neighbourhoods, connecting more than 700,000 new water users.
Public water operators as innovators 
Eau de Paris has changed the image of public operators. It has demonstrated 
that public operators are innovators when it comes to social and environmental 
policies and building a new democratic culture. Water conservation is one of 
the central strategies in Eau de Paris and the utility has taken the water pollution 
challenge seriously. It has developed partnerships with farmers around water 
catchment areas to help them switch to organic agriculture and reduce the use 
of chemicals. Anne Le Strat confidently says that democratic governance helps 
achieve quality services and build public service values. The Water Observatory 
in Paris has created a space for Parisians to engage in water policies. The observa-
tory together with other civic organisations and workers’ representatives sit on 
the board of Eau de Paris, with voting rights on strategic decisions. High levels 
of information disclosure and transparency are a precondition for democratic 
governance. Using different models, citizen participation in decision-making 
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are also a reality in Grenoble and Lacs de l’Essonne13 in France. Despite the 
tough social circumstances, Bolivian cities have also experimented with build-
ing social control in municipal companies. This tells us that remunicipalisation 
is not merely about a change in ownership but is also an opportunity to build 
a close relationship with users and to reinvent public services and values. The 
Paris Water Observatory model can be tried out elsewhere in the world. When 
citizens see the benefits from public water services and take ownership, they 
also become active defenders of their system. 
New opportunities for collaboration
Two chapters in this book were written by leaders of national public water as-
sociations in Germany and France. The Alliance of Public Water Associations 
(AöW) and France Eau Publique counter-lobby private water operators to 
protect the interests of public operators, and increasingly pool knowledge 
and experience to offer concrete alternatives. Such associations provide peer 
support based on the values of cooperation and solidarity, versus market 
competition, as explained by Christophe Lime (this volume). Collaboration 
is particularly important in the French context as many private contracts 
will expire in the coming years. From small towns to big cities, it is necessary 
for local authorities to equip themselves to make a logical decision on water 
management for citizens. Public operators’ associations have a unique role to 
play in uniting their members to serve the public interest. 
AöW and France Eau Publique are part of the European public water network 
Aqua Publica Europea. Regional and national public water associations, as 
well as civic organisations, are increasingly prepared to provide concrete sup-
port for remunicipalisation. Solidarity, cooperation and partnerships among 
public authorities can unlock more democratic, inclusive and sustainable wa-
ter services. The authors of the chapter on Jakarta propose in a similar way that 
public utility PAM Jaya set up a PuP with well-functioning public operators 
domestically and internationally to receive peer support for its rehabilitation. 
Public operators would also benefit from developing common understand-
ings of success in service provision. David McDonald, co-director of the 
Municipal Services Project, argues that indicators that enable the articulation 
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of public service values could go beyond current benchmarking systems that 
are driven by financial performance evaluation and are deeply embedded in 
market ideology. Although mainstream benchmarking may aim to enhance 
transparency and participation in principle, its technocratic and centralised 
nature paradoxically dominates the process. Measuring success is essential, but 
we need to account for the ‘public’ character of services. Equity, regardless of 
income, gender or ethnic group, means that people must get the same access 
to and quality of services, at affordable rates, all the while protecting workers’ 
health and safety. Such alternative benchmarking should provide the basis for 
users’ and workers’ participation. Public water associations can play an active 
role in rethinking ways of measuring the success of public water provision.
Citizen mobilisation 
Many of remunicipalisation’s successes would not have been possible without 
the tireless mobilisation of committed citizens. In Jakarta, citizens studied 
the problems of privatisation despite having limited access to information for 
years. Berliners had to organise a referendum just to demand that the secret 
private contracts be disclosed. Pressure from citizens swayed local authori-
ties’ positions on privatisation in Hamilton (Canada), Stuttgart (Germany), 
Grenoble, Rennes, Montpellier (France), Arenys de Munt (Spain), Stockton 
(US) and Buenos Aires (Argentina). The role of citizens and social movements 
illustrates that, ultimately, more is at stake than just a shift from private to 
public ownership in remunicipalisation. Remunicipalisation is about building 
better public services: services that are more transparent, more accountable, 
more efficient and focused on people’s needs over the long term. If citizens 
are willing to fight for remunicipalisation and against privatisation, it is also 
because they believe that the public sector is better equipped to meet broader 
social and environmental goals, and in a better position to address fundamen-
tal issues such as affordability and equity, as well as climate change adaptation, 
water conservation and the protection of ecosystems, as opposed to private 
companies’ focus on financial aspects. Clearly we cannot afford to continue 
to rely on private water ‘solutions’. 
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Practical guide for citizens and policy-makers 
As you prepare to remunicipalise water, please consider the following check 
list.
 Verify the private contract to see if there is a ‘termination for conve-
nience’ clause. This allows municipalities to exit the arrangement early 
for any reason as long as the private operator is given sufficient notice, 
although municipalities may have to pay termination fees.
 In the event of serious contract violations, you may need to pursue ‘ter-
mination for cause’ and this may allow exiting without compensation. 
However, municipalities may have to submit to legal arbitration.
 Check whether your country has signed a bilateral investment treaty 
with the country of origin of the private water operator. If so, extra 
attention will need to be paid to avoid a law suit before an international 
arbitration tribunal.
 Prepare well and take at least two years to examine the best way to 
terminate and to (re)establish the new public company. In the case of 
Paris, preparation took place over as much as seven years. 
 Do not waste precious time renegotiating with the private company. The 
city of Buenos Aires spent six years doing so and ended up remunicipal-
ising as a last resort. Jakarta spent four years in renegotiation without 
much gain. These years can be better spent on preparing remunicipalisa-
tion instead. 
 Information systems are essential in service provision (e.g. billing, data 
collection) and great care has to be given to their transfer to the public 
utility. Private companies may not cooperate as much as desired in this 
transfer of information. Arenys de Munt was handed down incomplete, 
encrypted and illegible information from the previous private owner. 
 Political will is important for remunicipalisation to succeed. Engaged 
city councils can greatly help by seeking peer support from other coun-
cils that have successfully remunicipalised services.
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 Consult and involve workers from the early stages of remunicipalisation. 
Their knowledge on the day-to-day operations of the water network and 
service is comprehensive. It is therefore critical to attract them to the 
new public company. Social dialogue on how to harmonise wage and 
conditions for all staff is needed to reach mutual agreement.
 Social dialogue can be expanded to have a broader discussion on what 
kind of public water company to (re)build. It is useful to explore how to 
better reflect the knowledge, commitment and demands of workers and 
users in the new public model. Public utilities can innovate by involving 
users and workers in strategic decision-making. This process helps make 
the new public company transparent and accountable.
 Develop indicators to measure the success of the new public model. In 
addition to measuring financial performance and operational efficiency, 
consider how to measure the quality of services through the lens of equity 
and sustainability.  
 Search for public operator partner(s) to enhance local capacity if needed.
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The Transnational Institute (TNI) is an international research and advocacy 
institute committed to building a just, democratic and sustainable planet. For 
more than 40 years, TNI has served as a unique nexus between social move-
ments, engaged scholars and policy makers. TNI serves as the coordinating 
hub of the Reclaiming Public Water  network. 
Contact: Satoko Kishimoto satoko@tni.org
www.tni.org 
The Multinationals Observatory aims to provide independent online news 
resources and in-depth investigations on the social, ecological and political 
impact of French transnational corporations, in a way that is useful for the 
action of civil society, MPs, businesspeople and communities. The website is 
published by Alter-médias, a French non-profit organisation that also runs 
the news website Basta! 
Contact: Olivier Petitjean opetitjean@multinationales.org
www.multinationales.org
The Public Services International Research Unit (PSIRU) investigates the 
impact of privatisation and liberalisation on public services, with a specific 
focus on water, energy, waste management, health and the social care sectors. 
Other research topics include the function and structure of public services, the 
strategies of multinational companies and influence of international financial 
institutions on public services. PSIRU is based in the Business Faculty, 
University of Greenwich, London, UK. 
Contact: Emanuele Lobina e.lobina@gre.ac.uk
www.psiru.org
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The Municipal Services Project (MSP) explores alternatives to privatisation 
in the health, water, sanitation and electricity sectors. The MSP is an inter-
disciplinary project made up of academics, labour unions, non-governmental 
organisations, social movements and activists from around the globe. Our 
website offers an interactive platform for researchers and others from around 
the world to engage in discussions on this topic. 
Contact: mspadmin@queensu.ca 
www.municipalservicesproject.org
The European Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU) is the largest 
federation of the ETUC and comprises 8 million public service workers from 
over 265 trade unions. EPSU organises workers in the energy, water and waste 
sectors, health and social services and local and national administration, in all 
European countries including in the EU’s Eastern Neighborhood. 
www.epsu.org 
130
The Reclaiming Public Water (RPW) network promotes people-centred and 
democratic public management in order to make the human right to water a 
practical reality for everyone. RPW is an open and horizontal network con-
necting civil society campaigners, trade unionists, researchers, community 
water associations and public water operators from around the world. 
The Remunicipalisation Tracker website aims to increase the visibility of the 
remunicipalisation trend by showcasing cities, regions and countries that have 
rolled back privatisation and embarked on securing public water for all that 
need it. New examples are added and existing cases updated regularly, with the 
support of water campaigners, public water utility managers, trade unionists 
and others committed to successful remunicipalisation. 
www.remunicipalisation.org 
PSIRU runs the project on “Post-New Public Management and water reform 
in the 21st century” which maps water remunicipalisation around the world. 
The results of the project are made available at www.psiru.org. For further 
information and to signal additional cases of remunicipalisation, please email 
e.lobina@gre.ac.uk. 
How to get involved

After three decades of often catastrophic results, many cities, 
regions and countries are closing the book on water privatisation. 
A quiet citizen revolution is unfolding as communities across the 
world reclaim control of their water services to manage this most 
crucial resource in a democratic, equitable and ecological way. 
Over the last 15 years, 235 cases of water remunicipalisation have 
been recorded in 37 countries. More than 100 million people have 
been affected by this global trend, whose pace is accelerating 
dramatically. 
From Jakarta to Paris, from Germany to the United States, this 
book draws lessons from this vibrant movement to reclaim 
water services. The authors show how remunicipalisation offers 
opportunities for developing socially desirable, environmentally 
sustainable and quality water services benefiting present and 
future generations. 
This book aims to engage citizens, workers and policy-makers in 
the experiences, lessons and good practices for returning water 
to the public sector. It is a critical resource to build the alliances 
that have the potential to turn the surge towards democratic, 
sustainable public water into an unstoppable wave.
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